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WITHHOLDING PROTECTION

Lindsay M. Harris *
ABSTRACT
In June 2018, President Trump wrote a pair of tweets en route
to his golf course, calling for “no Judges or Court Cases” at our border
and swift deportation of immigrants, essentially without due process.
While immigrant advocates were quick to explain the myriad
constitutional problems with this proposal, elements of Trump’s dream
are already a reality. This Article reveals how a single Customs and
Border Protection officer can short-circuit the checks and balances
prescribed by U.S. and international law to protect refugees from being
returned to harm, and cast a long shadow over a future, meritorious
asylum claim.
In light of the growing attention to the plight of those fleeing
persecution and seeking asylum at our borders, this Article examines
shortcomings in both law and practice, illuminating the long-lasting
ramifications of erroneously issued expedited removal orders for asylum
seekers and their families. Congress designed the expedited removal
system to expedite deportations and circumvent due process before an
immigration judge. Certain humanitarian protections are built into the
system to ensure that the United States meets its international and
domestic legal obligations not to return refugees to a place where they
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would face persecution or torture. In practice, these humanitarian
protections are too often improperly implemented and front-line border
enforcement officials, whether manifesting bias against asylum seekers
or lacking proper training and expertise, routinely ignore U.S. law and
the Department of Homeland Security’s own regulations. This results
in the wrongful deportation of asylum seekers and, as revealed in the
Article, in permanent negative ramifications for those lucky enough to
make it back over the border to in an attempt to re-apply for asylum.
The Article examines the disastrous interplay between two of the
“speed deportation” processes of expedited removal and reinstatement of
removal, the lack of sufficient safeguards that leave refugee screening
at our borders in the shadows, and the absence of judicial review. The
Article seeks not only to expose and analyze this problem, but also to
improve the situation by considering a suite of pragmatic, actionable
solutions to close the gap between the humanitarian protections
prescribed by law and the reality faced by asylum seekers at the U.S.
border. As an immediate first step to implement the humanitarian
protections enshrined in law, the Article explores the merits and risks
of using readily available technology: the use of Body-Worn Cameras by
Customs and Border Protection officers conducting screenings of
potential refugees at the border to fill the protection gap.
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INTRODUCTION
In June 2018, President Trump wrote a pair of tweets en route
to his golf course, calling for “no Judges or Court Cases” at our border
and swift deportation of immigrants, essentially without due process. 1
While immigrant advocates were quick to explain the myriad
constitutional problems with this proposal, 2 elements of Trump’s
dream were already a reality. 3 This Article reveals how a single
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer can short-circuit the
checks and balances prescribed by U.S. and international law to
protect refugees from being returned to harm, and cast a long shadow
over a future, meritorious asylum claim. 4 The Article proposes a
technology-based solution to this problem: the use of Body-Worn
Cameras by CBP officers.
The Article examines the expedited removal system, as well as
the consequences of an expedited removal order on asylum seekers and
their families, and makes clear the need for reform. Congress designed
this system to expedite deportations and circumvent due process before
1.
Philip Rucker & David Weigel, Trump Advocates Depriving
Undocumented Immigrants of Due Process Rights, WASH. POST (June 25, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/trump-advocates-depriving-undocum
ented-immigrants-of-due-process-rights/2018/06/24/dfa45d36-77bd-11e8-93cc-6d3
beccdd7a3_story.html?utm_term=.b948fe35c3ec (on file with the Columbia Human
Rights Law Review).
2.
Doina Chiacu & Sarah N. Lynch, Trump Says Illegal Immigrants Should
Be Deported with ‘No Judges or Court Cases’, REUTERS (June 24, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-trump/trump-says-illegalimmigrants-should-be-deported-with-no-judges-or-court-cases-idUSKBN1JK0OL
[https://perma.cc/5BXM-JHBQ].
3.
Jennifer Lee Koh & Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Deport, Not Court? The
U.S. Is Already Doing That, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/
opinion/op-ed/la-oe-koh-wadhia-deportations-20180630-story.html [https://perma
.cc/F7MZ-HJY6] (explaining that the majority of removals from the United States
are already carried out through speed deportation programs rather than fully
litigated court cases).
4.
As this article goes to print, the Trump Administration is experimenting
with giving CBP officers even more authority and discretion—by allowing them to
conduct credible fear interviews. See Stephen Dinan, Border Patrol Officers to
Double as Asylum Officers for Credible Fear Cases, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2019),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/apr/1/border-patrol-agents-doubleasylum-officers-credib/?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=twitter&utm_
source=socialnetwork [https://perma.cc/8URA-3V8G] (discussing a pilot program
deputizing CBP officers to conduct credible fear interviews). The credible fear
interview, currently conducted by United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services trained asylum officers, is discussed in Part I.A. 1 of this article, infra p.
22–28.
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an immigration judge in limited situations. Certain humanitarian
protections are built into the system in an attempt to ensure that the
United States meets its international and domestic legal obligations
not to return refugees to a place where they would face persecution
or torture. In reality, humanitarian protections are not properly
implemented and front-line border enforcement officials, who often
manifest bias against asylum seekers and lack proper training and
expertise, routinely ignore U.S. law and the Department of Homeland
Security’s (DHS) own regulations. This results in both the wrongful
deportation of asylum seekers and, as will be explained, permanent
negative ramifications for those lucky enough to make it back over the
border to seek asylum in the future.
Though the failures of the expedited removal system existed
prior to 2017, the Trump Administration has exacerbated the problem
through anti-immigrant rhetoric, policies, and actions. 5 An expedited
5.
Indeed, under the Trump Administration, turnbacks of asylum seekers at
the border have increased. A high-profile and recent example of these problems was
the refugee caravan in April and May of 2018, where border officials denied entry
to a caravan of asylum seekers, forcing them to wait outside the United States’ port
of entry. Kirk Semple & Miriam Jordan, Migrant Caravan of Asylum Seekers
Reaches the U.S. Border, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/04/29/world/americas/mexico-caravan-trump.html?rref=collection%2Fsection
collection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=rank&modul
e=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=sectionfront (on file
with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). Eventually, perhaps due to the
media coverage the caravan received, the asylum-seeking caravan members were
allowed into the United States and their quest for protection deferred, rather than
denied entirely. In the summer of 2018, with the public’s interest in asylum seekers
piqued by the Administration’s family separation policy, mainstream media started
to cover the issue of asylum seekers being turned back at ports of entry in Texas
and California. Neena Satija, The Trump Administration Is Not Keeping Its
Promises to Asylum Seekers Who Come to Ports of Entry, TEX. TRIB. & REVEAL (July
5,
2018),
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/07/05/migrants-seeking-asylumlegally-ports-entry-turned-away-separated-fami/ [https://perma.cc/NW94-YQHA];
John Burnett, After Traveling 2,000 Miles for Asylum, This Family’s Journey Halts
at a Bridge, NPR (June 15, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/15/620310589/aftera-2-000-mile-asylum-journey-family-is-turned-away-before-reaching-u-s-soil
[https://perma.cc/ACC9-8HCN]. As of July 2018, the Administration is apparently
considering an official policy blocking asylum seekers from claiming protection at
ports of entry. Caitlin Dickerson, Trump Administration Considers Unprecedented
Curbs on Asylum for Migrants, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/07/18/us/immigration-asylum-children.html (on file with the
Columbia Human Rights Law Review). As this article goes to print, the Trump
Administration introduced the “Remain in Mexico” policy, which requires asylum
seekers to await adjudication of their claims in Mexico. This policy has been
challenged in federal court because it violates the Immigration and Nationality Act,
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removal order is one issued by a low-level border official, usually within
a matter of days, without an individual ever going before an
immigration judge. For an asylum seeker who is successful in entering
the asylum process upon a second or third attempt, a prior
expedited removal order—even if issued in violation of government
regulations—nonetheless has lasting adverse ramifications. An
individual with one or more removal orders, who has actually been
removed, and who re-enters the United States without permission 6 is
the Administrative Procedure Act, and constitutional protections. See Complaint at
3, Innovation Law Lab v. Nielsen, No. 3:19-cv-0080Y7 (N.D. Cal Feb. 14, 2019). For
an overview of the dire consequences of this policy, see HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST,
BARRED AT THE BORDER, WAIT “LISTS” LEAVE ASYLUM SEEKERS IN PERIL AT TEXAS
PORTS OF ENTRY (Apr. 2019), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/
files/BARRED_AT_THE_BORDER.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6XB-RNGX].
6.
Conversely, if an individual has a prior removal order and does not enter
without permission, instead seeking admission at a port of entry, that individual is
not subjected to reinstatement of removal or withholding-only proceedings, and is
instead referred for a credible fear interview. In the last couple of years, however,
increasingly CBP officers are illegally turning away asylum seekers across the
Southern Border at both major and minor ports of entry following the November
2016 election of Donald Trump as U.S. President. See B. SHAW DRAKE, ELEANOR
ACER & OLGA BYRNE, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, CROSSING THE LINE: U.S. BORDER
AGENTS ILLEGALLY REJECT ASYLUM SEEKERS 3, 5 (2017), http://www.
humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrf-crossing-the-line-report.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/FUL9-4CDX] [hereinafter HRF, CROSSING THE LINE]; Letter from Am.
Immigration Council et al. to Megan Mack, Officer for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties,
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., & John Roth, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. 1 (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/
files/general_litigation/cbp_systemic_denial_of_entry_to_asylum_seekers_advocac
y_document.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZQ8-3LE2]; see also Michael Garcia Bochenek,
US Turning Away Asylum Seekers at Mexican Border: Central Americans Who Flee
for Their Lives Denied Entry by US Border Guards, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May
3, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/03/us-turning-away-asylum-seekersmexican-border [https://perma.cc/Q8KV-9BE3]; Vivian Yee, ‘They Treated Us Like
Criminals’: U.S. Border Crossers Report Severe Reception, N.Y. TIMES (May 1,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/customs-airports-trump.html (on
file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). Indeed, there is a class action
lawsuit pending in California on this very issue. Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief at 1–3, Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Kelly, No. 2:17-cv-5111 (C.D. Cal. July
12, 2017), https://americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/litigation_doc
uments/challenging_custom_and_border_protections_unlawful_practice_of_turnin
g_away_asylum_seekers_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6F6-EL42] [hereinafter
Al Otro Lado Complaint]. Reports in 2018 have also highlighted turnbacks of
asylum seekers before they reach the port of entry. One family was turned back
nine times before being allowed to proceed with their claim for asylum inside the
United States. Robert Moore, At the U.S. Border, Asylum Seekers Fleeing Violence
Are Told to Come Back Later, WASH. POST (June 13, 2018), https://www.washington
post.com/world/national-security/at-the-us-border-asylum-seekers-fleeing-violence
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at risk of having those orders “reinstated” at the discretion of a CBP
border official, which then precludes that individual from later being
granted asylum protection. 7 Instead, she is eligible only for a lesser
form of protection called “withholding of removal.” 8
Take Cecilia’s case, 9 for example: Cecilia, the mother of two
young children, fled to the United States three times to escape
persecution at the hands of her children’s father, who had repeatedly
attacked her since she was thirteen years old. Before seeking
protection in the United States, Cecilia had made eight attempts to flee
locally in Honduras and even El Salvador, but her persecutor found her
each time.
Cecilia first sought protection in the United States in May
2014, when border officials arrested her near McAllen, Texas. While
holding Cecilia in immigration custody, border officials asked why she
came to the United States. Cecilia told officials she was afraid the
father of her children would kill her, but the officials failed to record
her fear or ask her the mandatory questions about that fear, in
violation of their own regulations.
Under U.S. law, border agents must refer anyone who
expresses a fear of persecution to the asylum office for a fear
interview. 10 After Cecilia expressed her fear, instead of referring her to
the asylum office, the border agent promptly processed her for
deportation. Without an officer reading Cecilia’s statement back to her

-are-told-to-come-back-later/2018/06/12/79a12718-6e4d-11e8-afd5-778aca903bbe_s
tory.html?utm_term=.aa145fd06921 (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law
Review). Notably, the right of an individual to seek asylum and not be returned to
danger attaches prior to a potential refugee’s arrival at the border and the State’s
duty not to refoule prohibits any measure resulting in refugees being “pushed back
into the arms of their persecutors.” See B. Shaw Drake & Elizabeth Gibson,
Vanishing Protection: Access to Asylum at the Border, 21 CUNY L. REV. 91, 99–100
(2017) [hereinafter Drake & Gibson, Vanishing Protection] (citing JAMES C.
HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 301 (2005)).
7.
See infra Section II.C. (discussing the valiant attempts by advocates to
fight, in Courts of Appeals, for asylum seekers with prior removal orders subject to
reinstatement of removal).
8.
8 C.F.R. § 241.8 (2018).
9.
The client’s name has been changed to protect her identity, but her story
is used with her permission. Cecilia is a client of the University of the District of
Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law Immigration and Human Rights Clinic.
All facts are from the client file, which is on file with the author.
10.
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 235(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(A) (2012).
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or informing her of her rights—both procedures required by
regulation 11—immigration officials deported her to Honduras.
Cecilia was only in Honduras for a few weeks before fleeing for
her life again. In June 2014, border officials arrested her in Rio Grande
City, Texas. Once again, they violated the law by refusing to ask Cecilia
any questions regarding her fear of returning to Honduras, and instead
quickly deported her a second time.
Cecilia entered the United States a third time in October 2015,
making one last desperate attempt to survive, this time fleeing with
her five-year-old daughter. Again, border officials apprehended and
detained her. Unlike in her previous two attempts to seek protection,
immigration officials listened to Cecilia’s fear that she would be killed
by the father of her children and properly referred the matter to the
Asylum Office. Cecilia underwent a reasonable fear interview, after
which the Asylum Office issued a positive fear determination. Cecilia
was then released to pursue her claim for protection in immigration
court.
Two and a half years later, in April of 2018, an immigration
judge heard Cecilia’s case in Arlington, Virginia. Cecilia was in
“withholding only” proceedings, because her prior removal order had
been “reinstated.” By contrast, her daughter, whose claim was largely
the same as Cecilia’s, was in asylum proceedings, having never been
previously deported. Before the trial, with the help of her lawyer,
Cecilia asked Customs and Border Protection to rescind the two
erroneously issued removal orders and received a negative response
several months later. Cecilia also asked the government trial attorney
to exercise prosecutorial discretion to allow her to pursue a claim for
asylum. Without any documented statements of Cecilia’s fear during
her interactions with CBP at the border in 2014, the trial attorney
declined to exercise discretion in this way. Lacking the authority to
remedy the situation, the immigration judge granted Cecilia
“withholding” protection and her daughter asylum in court on the day
of the hearing. The government waived appeal.
Cecilia’s eleven-year-old son remained in Honduras, at risk of
violent abuse by his father. As a withholding grantee, Cecilia is unable
to travel outside the United States. She is also unable to petition for
her son to join her in the United States and faced the difficult choice of
whether to send her son on the treacherous journey that she knows so
well, alone, as an unaccompanied minor. Cecilia is barred from asylum
11.

8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i) (2018).
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because of the overbroad provisions allowing for reinstatement of
removal and because courts have interpreted the law to say that those
with reinstated removal orders cannot apply for asylum. Cecilia’s case
may have worked out very differently, as will be discussed in this
Article, if there were an actual record of the two times she expressed
her fear to border agents and it was ignored.
Cecilia’s case makes clear how problematic implementation of
expedited removal, coupled with reinstatement of removal, is for
asylum seekers. Both asylum and withholding are forms of protection,
along with relief under the Convention Against Torture, for individuals
fleeing persecution. There are, however, substantial differences
between the three forms of relief and who, in general, is entitled to
receive each form of protection.
First, asylum is discretionary and affords the most robust
protection for those fleeing persecution. 12 To be granted asylum, an
individual must meet the refugee definition, which includes:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such
person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling
to return to, and is unwilling or unable to avail himself
or herself or the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion. 13
Once an asylum seeker is granted asylum and becomes an
“asylee,” she has a path to U.S. citizenship and certain benefits along
the way. 14 An asylee is also permitted to travel overseas and, often
most importantly, to apply for family reunification. 15

12.
See OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ASYLUM AND
WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL RELIEF CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE PROTECTIONS
(2009),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2009/01/23/Asylum
WithholdingCATProtections.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N2K5-84ST];
see
INA
§ 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(A)(42) (defining refugee status); INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (providing that “the Secretary of Homeland Security or the
Attorney General may grant asylum” to an eligible applicant) (emphasis added).
13.
INA § 101(a)(42).
14.
See, e.g., Lindsay M. Harris, From Surviving to Thriving: An
Investigation of Asylee Integration in the United States, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 29, 40–49 (2016) [hereinafter Harris, From Surviving to Thriving]
(discussing the benefits that asylees are eligible for as long as they meet state
requirements).
15.
For more detail on the benefits for “asylees,” see Section I.C, infra.

2019]

Withholding Protection

11

Certain individuals are barred from asylum protection,
including those who: have filed their application for asylum more than
one year after their arrival in the United States; 16 have previously been
denied asylum; 17 or have been “firmly resettled” in another country
prior to arriving in the United States. 18 The merits of these bars can be
debated, though they rest on discernable principles. For example,
individuals who have previously applied for asylum and been denied
by a judge are assumed not to have a valid claim; asylum seekers who
delay their filing for more than a year are thought to have potentially
fraudulent claims; 19 and those who have already gained protection in
another country should not be able to access our limited protection
resources. 20 For all of these bars to asylum, however, the asylum seeker
has the right to present evidence, to argue certain exceptions apply,
and to have the potential bar subjected to the scrutiny of an
immigration judge, who has the ultimate decision-making authority
regarding whether an individual is barred from asylum. 21
Second, withholding of removal (“withholding”) is a mandatory
form of relief—if an individual meets the eligibility requirements, that
relief must be granted. 22 This is tied to the United States’ international
treaty obligation not to refoule, or return, an individual to a country
where his or her “life or freedom would be threatened.” 23 To obtain this
relief, individuals must meet a higher legal standard and burden of

16.
INA § 208(a)(2)(B), (d); see generally Lindsay M. Harris, The One-Year
Bar to Asylum in the Age of the Immigration Court Backlog, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1185,
1213–24 (2016) [hereinafter Harris, The One-Year Bar] (examining the one-year
bar to asylum and how flaws in the immigration system impede compliance).
17.
INA § 208(a)(2)(C)–(D). An application is deemed denied only if denied
by an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals, not the Asylum
Office. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(3) (2018).
18.
8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(c)(2)(i)(B), 208.15 (2018).
19.
For an overview of the origins of the one-year filing deadline, connected
to fears about asylum fraud, along with a detailed critique of the one-year filing
deadline and the ways in which it does not take into account that genuine asylum
seekers have valid reasons for missing the deadline that are not covered by the
current extraordinary or changed circumstances exceptions, see Harris, The One
Year Bar, supra note 16.
20.
See, e.g., Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486, 489–503 (B.I.A. 2011)
(discussing the origins and implementation of policies against firm resettlement
and the evolution of the firm resettlement bar over the years).
21.
See 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (2018).
22.
INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012).
23.
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967).
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proof. 24 Although withholding protection is harder to obtain, the
benefits are far inferior to asylum—unlike asylum seekers,
withholding recipients cannot travel overseas with the certainty that
they can return to the United States, cannot petition for family
members, and have no pathway to citizenship. 25 Essentially, they live
in limbo, having to continually renew their work permits and check in
regularly with deportation officers. 26 Further, individuals eligible only
for withholding are more likely to be detained during the adjudication
of their claim for protection. 27
Third, applicants for whom criminal bars defeat both asylum
and withholding eligibility and who fear government-sanctioned
torture in their home country may be eligible for relief under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 28

24.
To obtain withholding, an applicant must show a “clear probability” of
persecution, meaning that the applicant is more likely than not to be persecuted,
while asylum only requires a “well-founded fear” of persecution, meaning the
applicant faces at least a one-in-ten chance of persecution. See generally INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (deciding that the standard for asylum is less
stringent than that for withholding).
25.
Withholding of Removal and CAT, IMMIGR. EQUALITY, https://www.
immigrationequality.org/get-legal-help/our-legal-resources/asylum/withholding-ofremoval-and-cat/#.W8uQ1RNKjq0 [https://perma.cc/GS8B-XK9K].
26.
Id.
27.
See, e.g., DAVID HAUSMAN, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FACT SHEET:
WITHHOLDING-ONLY CASES AND DETENTION AN ANALYSIS BASED ON DATA
OBTAINED THROUGH THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (Apr. 19, 2015)
[hereinafter ACLU FACT SHEET: WITHHOLDING-ONLY CASES AND DETENTION],
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/withholding_only_fact_she
et_-_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/35PC-GBH6] (reporting that in over 85% of
withholding-only cases, respondents remained detained throughout the
adjudication of their claims); Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Class Action
Complaint, Martinez-Banos v. Asher, No. 2:16-cv-01454 (W.D. Wash. 2016), https://
www.nwirp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Martinez-Banos-et-al.-v.-Asher-Comp
laint2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KNM-PXDL] (challenging ICE’s practice of refusing to
allow bond hearings for individuals in withholding-only proceedings); YALE LAW
SCH. LOWENSTEIN INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, U.S. DETENTION AND REMOVAL OF
ASYLUM SEEKERS: AN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ANALYSIS 39–40, 40
n.273 (2016), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/schell/human_rights_
first_-_immigration_detention_-_final_-_20160620_for_publication.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z6KZ-367G] (“DHS arrests people who are subject to
reinstatement of removal and keeps them in custody throughout the reinstatement
proceedings, without the opportunity to seek bond.”).
28.
This includes individuals who have been convicted of a particularly
serious crime in the United States, have committed a serious non-political crime
outside the United States, or pose a threat to U.S. national security. INA
§ 208(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv) (2012). It also includes those
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Federal circuit courts have found, however, that there is
another way in which individuals are categorically barred from
asylum: a reinstated removal order. Such an order precludes the right
to any review of an applicant’s asylum eligibility by an immigration
judge. 29 Any removal order can be reinstated, but this Article focuses
specifically on the situation where an individual receives an expedited
removal order, and a border official later decides to subject that
individual to reinstatement of removal after the individual re-enters
without inspection. In this situation, as with those barred by failure to
file within one year or because they were “firmly resettled” in another
country, the applicant is only eligible for withholding of removal. 30
Unlike the one-year or firm resettlement bars, however, in this
situation the immigration judge has no jurisdiction over whether the
individual is in fact subject to a bar from asylum and can only grant
withholding protection. 31 In other words, the individual has no way to
argue to an immigration judge that the reinstated removal order is the
result of an erroneous or illegal action by immigration officials.

EXPEDITED REMOVAL AND REINSTATEMENT OF REMOVAL
This Article builds upon prior scholarship, which has broadly
examined the “shadow” deportation system, including the expedited
removal and reinstatement of removal processes. 32 This Article is the
who are members of a terrorist organization, have participated in terrorist activity,
or have given material support to a terrorist organization, INA §§ 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(I)–
(IV), (VI), 237(a)(4)(B), or who have persecuted others, INA §§ 101(a)(42)(B),
208(b)(2)(A)(i).
29.
8 C.F.R. § 241.8 (2018). This is discussed in depth in Section II.C, infra.
30.
See id. § 241.8(e) (providing an exception to reinstatement of removal for
an individual expressing fear to be referred for a reasonable, rather than credible,
fear interview, leading to potential withholding, rather than asylum eligibility).
31.
See id. § 241.8(a) (“The alien has no right to a hearing before an
immigration judge in such circumstances.”).
32.
INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012); see, e.g., Jennifer
Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181,
187 (2017) [hereinafter Koh, Removal in the Shadows] (examining five types of
removal orders: expedited removal, reinstatement of removal, administrative
removal of non-lawful permanent residents with aggravated felony convictions, in
absentia orders for failure to appear in immigration court, and stipulated removal
orders following waivers of the right to a court hearing). Professor Wadhia refers to
expedited removal and reinstatement along with administrative removals as “speed
deportations.” Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportations and the
Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 6 (2015) [hereinafter Wadhia, Speed
Deportations]; Jill Family refers to some of these procedures, outside immigration
courts, as “diversions.” Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering
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first, however, to fully explore how the interaction of expedited removal
and reinstatement of removal blocks asylum seekers from meaningful
protection, relegating them to withholding protection only.
Expedited removal and reinstatement of removal are
important areas for examination. 33 The use of these summary
deportation systems is on the rise. 34 Indeed, expedited removals and
reinstatement represent the majority of all removals in the United
States. In 2016, the most recent year for which statistics were available
at the time of writing, 83% of removals took place through
reinstatement of prior removal orders or expedited removal of
individuals seeking admission at the border. 35
In addition to the alarming frequency of its use of expedited
removal and reinstatement, the Trump Administration has also
referred to plans to expand the Department of Homeland Security’s
authority to use expedited removal to the full extent permitted by
statute. 36 This would allow the government to issue expedited removal
Contributors to the Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 542
(2011). Stephen Manning and Kari Hong refer to expedited removal as “rapid
removals.” See Stephen Manning & Kari Hong, Getting It Righted: Access to Counsel
in Rapid Removals, 101 MARQ. L. REV. 673, 676–79 (2018) [hereinafter Manning &
Hong, Access to Counsel]; see also Jennifer Lee Koh, When Shadow Removals
Collide: Searching for Solutions to the Legal Black Holes Created by Expedited
Removal and Reinstatement, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 337, 340–41 (2018) [hereinafter
Koh, Searching for Solutions] (examining two forms of “shadow removals,”
categorized as expedited removal and reinstatement of removal).
33.
Koh, Searching for Solutions, supra note 32, at 343 (referring to the
intersection of expedited removal and reinstatement of removal as “legal black
holes—spaces in which executive power is particularly high but where
accountability and review are almost nonexistent”) (citing Ralph Wilde, Legal
“Black Holes?” Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil
and Political Rights, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 739, 775 (2005)).
34.
See generally AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR.,
REMOVAL WITHOUT RECOURSE: THE GROWTH OF SUMMARY DEPORTATIONS FROM
THE UNITED STATES (2014), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/
research/removal-without-recourse-growth-summary-deportations-united-states
[https://perma.cc/5YHD-5J6P] (analyzing the dramatic increase in the number of
deportations carried out through summary removal procedures, including
expedited removal and reinstatement of removal, since 1996).
35.
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
ANNUAL REPORT, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2016, at 8 (2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Enforcement_Actions_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VS94-FN23] (reporting that of 340,056 removals in 2016, 141,518
were expedited removal orders and 143,003 were reinstatements, totaling 284,521,
or 83.6%).
36.
Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Security, to
Kevin McAleenan, et al, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., at 6 (Feb.
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orders throughout the United States against any individual who had
not previously been admitted or paroled and is unable to show that he
or she has been continuously physically present within the United
States for at least two years. 37
The shortcomings of regular immigration court removal
proceedings are even starker in the context of shadow removals. 38
Indeed, procedural due process rights only apply in immigration
court. 39 Outside of immigration court, in the expedited removal and
reinstatement context, Customs and Border Protection officers “act as
investigator, judge, and jury, with the immigration courts completely
uninvolved in the removability determination.” 40 Unlike immigration
judges and asylum officers, CBP officers must meet only minimal
eligibility requirements for the job and are not required to have legal
training. 41 As will be explained in Section I.C below, the actions of
these officers have profound and prolonged consequences for asylum
seekers.
Between 1996 and 2016, scholars estimate that rapid removals
have accounted for the removal of more than 4.2 million people, all
without any review or oversight by the immigration court system. 42
20, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13,767, 83 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8786 (Jan. 15, 2017), § 11(c).
For an explanation of the origins and makeup of the Department of Homeland
Security, see Wadhia, Speed Deportations, supra note 32, at 5–6. For an exploration
of the expansion of expedited removals, including implementation of the
“contiguous territories” provision, see Geoffrey Hoffman, Contiguous Territories:
The Expanded Use of “Expedited Removal” in the Trump Era, 33 MD. J. INT’L L. 268,
269–73 (2018).
37.
See INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (2012).
38.
Koh, Removal in the Shadows, supra note 32, at 222–32 (highlighting
how the problems posed by detention, lack of appointed counsel, limits on judicial
review, and restrictions on relief and meaningful discretion are exacerbated in the
context of shadow removals).
39.
Id. at 192.
40.
Id. at 193. This is not the only area of law in which low level officials
must administer complex immigration laws. See Amanda Frost, Learning from Our
Mistakes: Using Immigration Enforcement Errors to Guide Reform, 92 DENV. U. L.
REV. 769, 773 (2015) [hereinafter Frost, Learning from our Mistakes].
41.
These requirements include being a U.S. citizen, holding a valid driver’s
license, being eligible to carry a firearm, being under the age of 40 at the time of
referral, and residing in the United States for three of the past five years. CBP
officers must go through the hiring process, which includes a basic medical exam,
fitness test, background investigation, interview, drug test, and polygraph test. See
CBPO Application Process, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.
cbp.gov/careers/frontline-careers/cbpo/app-proc [https://perma.cc/XW5C-L59R].
42.
Manning & Hong, Access to Counsel, supra note 32, at 680 (calculating
that number based on data from 2010–2016, where rapid removals accounted for
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Unlike previous scholarship, which has addressed the effects of these
processes on individuals in the United States with existing ties to the
community, 43 this Article focuses on asylum seekers arriving at the
border and the consequences of erroneously issued expedited removal
orders for those asylum seekers.
As a further sign of the increasing importance of the interplay
between expedited removal and reinstatement of removal, according to
the EOIR Statistical Yearbook for 2016, the immigration courts saw a
dramatic rise in withholding-only proceedings from fiscal years 2012
to 2016. In FY 2012, immigration courts held 1,091 withholding-only
proceedings, but in 2016, this number was 3,249. 44
This threefold increase in just four years is likely explained by
the rising numbers of expedited removal orders issued against arriving
asylum seekers who, like Cecilia, are not properly referred to credible
fear interviews (CFI). This forces those with a genuine fear of
persecution to make the dangerous journey again. When those asylum
seekers enter a second or third time, their prior expedited removal
order and reinstatement of removal render them ineligible for asylum
protection. 45 Because of the prior order of removal, they are eligible
only for a reasonable fear interview (RFI), which, if positive, puts them
into withholding-only proceedings in immigration court. 46
The number of individuals in withholding-only proceedings is
relatively low compared to the number removed via expedited removal
at the border. But those with reinstated removal orders upon entering
a second or third time are subjected to a higher standard within the
RFI than would be applied in a CFI, 47 and thus may not pass that
threshold test despite having an otherwise potentially valid asylum
claim. 48
76% of all removals, and extrapolating that same percentage rate to all reported
removals between 1996–2016).
43.
Koh, Searching for Solutions, supra note 32 (focusing particularly on
individuals with existing ties to the United States and how they are affected by the
interplay between reinstatement and expedited removal).
44.
EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY
2016 STATISTICS YEARBOOK, B1 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/
file/fysb16/download [https://perma.cc/2CBR-HLVL] [hereinafter EOIR FY 16
STATISTICS YEARBOOK]; see also Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation, supra note
32, at 5–6 (citing the 2013 yearbook).
45.
See infra text accompanying notes 160–76.
46.
8 C.F.R. § 208.31 (2018).
47.
See infra text accompanying notes 89–92.
48.
Other possible explanations for the increase in withholding proceedings
could be that DHS has improved its screening of individuals with a reasonable fear
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This Article examines the profound and very human
consequences of the interaction between expedited removal and
reinstatement of removal. The piece then introduces solutions and
examines how the use of readily available technology may
safeguard the humanitarian protections for asylum seekers at our
borders—protections which, while guaranteed by our laws, are too
easily denied in practice.
The Article will examine the expedited removal system and
contrast the intended system with its reality. The Article will then
make clear the ramifications of a split-second decision made by border
enforcement officials to ignore an articulated fear of return and issue
an expedited removal order. Part I examines the intersection of
expedited removal and reinstatement of removal and how their
interplay affects asylum seekers specifically.
Part II examines discretionary remedies for asylum seekers
along with a lack of meaningful appellate review and largely
unsuccessful challenges in the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals. The
first discretionary remedy is to ask CBP border officials to rescind the
underlying removal order and to rescind reinstatement of removal
orders. Second, an asylum seeker can ask the government trial
attorney assigned to the case to exercise discretion to issue a new
Notice to Appear, rather than accepting the Notice of Referral from
CBP to withholding-only proceedings. Next, this Part discusses relief
through the appellate courts and explains how this avenue is
insufficient.
In Part III, the Article proposes solutions to remedy the denial
of meaningful protection for asylum seekers. This Part considers a
broad range of solutions, including statutory overhaul and increasing
Congressional oversight, encouraging prosecutorial discretion,
increasing access to counsel, and enhancing training of border officials
administering the expedited removal system.
Part IV proposes that, in the absence of larger statutory reform
dismantling or dramatically overhauling the expedited removal and
reinstatement of removal processes, the government should institute
of return or simply that more individuals who are ineligible for asylum have a fear
of return. See Wadhia, Speed Deportations, supra note 32, at 13–14. Indeed, the
number of reasonable fear interviews has also increased during this time period.
See EOIR FY16 STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 44, at B1 (815 in 2012 and 2,552
in 2016). Alternatively, the increase in withholding-only proceedings may be simply
tied to the growth in reinstatements and administrative removals by DHS. Wadhia,
Speed Deportations, supra note 32, at 14.
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the use of Body-Worn Cameras (BWCs), a practical and expedient
solution which follows the lead of law enforcement agencies across the
country. This would require all CBP officials, who are empowered to
issue the initial expedited removal orders and ask the screening
questions around fear to identify asylum seekers, to wear and use body
cameras in those interactions. The body cameras would create a
permanent record of the initial screening interview, taking expedited
removal out of the shadows. Knowing that their actions are being
recorded would hopefully encourage officers to follow the law and
procedures for properly screening potential asylum seekers in
expedited removal. Failing that, complete video footage of the entire
screening interaction would give supervising border officials and trial
attorneys the information they need to rescind the underlying
expedited removal order and to exercise prosecutorial discretion to
decline to reinstate the underlying removal order. Finally,
implementation of BWCs also gives Congress a mechanism to ensure
that the law is implemented as intended.
As will be discussed, video or even audio footage of Cecilia’s
interactions with border officials would have preserved her articulated
fear claim and perhaps persuaded CBP to rescind their erroneously
issued removal orders, or the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) trial attorney to exercise his discretion and allow her to pursue
asylum relief. 49 In the absence of more dramatic reform that overhauls
49.
It should be noted, however, that in many ways things would have been
worse for Cecilia arriving at the border today. For a period of time in 2018, border
officials would have taken her five-year-old daughter away and she could have
spent months separated from her child. Further, former Attorney General Jefferson
B. Sessions’ decision issued in June 2018 attempts to undo asylum and withholding
protection for those fleeing domestic violence or gang violence at the hands of nonstate actors, so Cecilia may have never received a positive decision in her fear
interview with asylum officers. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018)
(overruling the BIA decision, Matter of A-R-C-G-, which recognized domestic
violence as a potential ground for asylum). Further, Cecilia may have also faced
prosecution for “illegal entry” under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012), or even for “illegal
reentry” under § 1327, despite the fact that under Article 31 of the Refugee
Convention, asylum seekers should not be penalized for irregular entry. Compare
Attorney General Announces Zero-Tolerance for Criminal Illegal Entry, U.S. DEP’T
JUST. (Apr. 6, 2018) [hereinafter Attorney General Announces Zero-Tolerance],
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero-tolerance-policycriminal-illegal-entry [https://perma.cc/6RNG-QKNN], with Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees art. 31, Jul. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. Matter of A-B- is
just the latest in what Professor Sarah Sherman-Stokes argues is a decades-long
series of government actions aimed at undermining recognition of refugee status
for Central Americans, see Sarah Sherman-Stokes, Refugees of the Northern
Triangle: Legacies of Discrimination and Denial 2–3 (July 24, 2018) (unpublished
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or eliminates the use of expedited removal, this Article proposes that
CBP officials be required to wear body cameras as a short-term
solution to prevent erroneous deportations with potentially deadly
consequences, preserve due process, and increase transparency. The
Article explores the proposed implementation of this solution, drawing
from the literature in the criminal context, post-Ferguson in
particular, to explore the costs, efficiencies, concerns, and dynamics of
BWCs.

I. EXPEDITED REMOVAL IN THEORY VS. EXPEDITED REMOVAL IN
PRACTICE
This Part will present the legal framework for expedited
removal and the built-in mandatory protections for asylum seekers. It
contrasts the way the system was envisioned with the well-documented
reality of expedited removal’s rampant abuse. Finally, this Part
explains the consequences of that abuse—the erroneous issuance of
removal orders for asylum seekers that subjects them to deportation.
Not only that, but if an asylum seeker makes it back to the United
States to seek protection on subsequent occasions, and if she then
enters without inspection, she is at serious risk of being subjected to
reinstatement of removal, which would render her no longer eligible
for asylum protection. 50
First, the two discretionary “speed deportation” procedures
central to this Article are expedited removal and reinstatement of
removal. Expedited removal is a process where certain noncitizens can
be removed from the United States without appearing before an
immigration judge. 51 Expedited removal can apply to (1) individuals
arriving at a port of entry without proper documentation, 52 and (2)

manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review). The
implementation of Matter of A-B- was challenged in federal district court and the
Court enjoined key portions of the decision and implementing policy memorandum
from USCIS. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION & CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE
STUDIES, PRACTICE ADVISORY: GRACE V. WHITAKER (Mar. 7, 2019), https://
www.aclu.org/legal-document/grace-v-whitaker-practice-advisory [https://perma.
cc/2B9C-HUF6].
50.
8 C.F.R. § 241.8 (2018). Many asylum seekers enter without inspection,
rather than seeking asylum at a port of entry. This is increasingly understandable
given the alarming rates at which CBP is unlawfully turning back those who seek
asylum at ports of entry. See supra notes 5 and 6.
51.
INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
52.
Id.
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individuals apprehended between ports of entry, 53 among others.
Reinstatement of removal refers to the process by which DHS can
reinstate final removal orders, including expedited removal orders,
without any hearing or review, for noncitizens ordered removed who
were in fact removed and then subsequently reentered the United
States without inspection. 54 Congress created both expedited removal
and reinstatement of removal, but did not mandate their blanket use
in all individual cases or categories of cases. 55

A. The Legal Framework for Expedited Removal and Mandatory
Protections for Asylum Seekers
Before 1996, any person arriving in the United States had the
right to seek asylum before an immigration court without passing any
initial screening test, and could then appeal that decision to the Board
of Immigration Appeals, the federal circuit courts, and potentially even
to the Supreme Court. 56 Congress dramatically changed that system
when they created the expedited removal system in 1996 57 to more
quickly deport recent inadmissible non-asylum seeking migrants found
53.
Id. § 235(b)(1)(A)(iii). The INA allows DHS to use expedited removal for
any noncitizen who cannot prove that she has been physically present in the United
States continuously for the two-year period immediately prior to apprehension, but
this authority is currently limited to individuals apprehended within one hundred
miles of the southwest border and within fourteen days of unlawfully entering the
United States. Notice Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg.
48,877, 48,879 (Aug. 11, 2004). Regulations also permit DHS to use expedited
removal for aliens apprehended within two years after arriving by sea without
being admitted or paroled. Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal
Under § 235(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg.
68,924, 68,926 (Nov. 13, 2002).
54.
INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012).
55.
See infra note 151; see also AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL ET AL., THE
FLORES LITIGATION AND THE IMPACT ON FAMILY DETENTION, AILA DOC. 15504332
at 2 (2015), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/press-releases/2015/fact-sheet-floreslitigation-family-detention [https://perma.cc/AQS8-AZTB] (“DHS has taken the
position that individuals in ‘expedited’ removal proceedings—rather than ordinary
removal proceedings before an immigration judge—are subject to mandatory
detention prior to receiving positive credible fear determinations. But the type of
removal proceeding DHS chooses to initiate is completely within its own
discretion.”).
56.
See Bo Cooper, Procedures for Expedited Removal and Asylum Screening
Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
29 CONN. L. REV. 1501, 1502 (1997) [hereinafter Cooper, Procedures of Expedited
Removal] (describing expedited removal as a “colossal change from prior law”).
57.
INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), (b)(1)(B)(iii)(I) (setting up the expedited removal
system).
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at or near the border. 58 At the same time, Congress created safeguards
to ensure that asylum seekers would be protected and allowed to
exercise their Refugee Convention rights to seek asylum protection. In
theory, immigrant families seeking protection at the border should
benefit from the humanitarian safeguards built into the expedited
removal system to prevent those who may be persecuted or tortured
from being deported, which would be contrary to our international 59
and domestic legal obligations to protect those individuals.

58.
The use of expedited removal has rapidly expanded since its initial
implementation. Originally, expedited removal was only implemented at ports of
entry, but it was expanded beyond the border in 2004, when Congress passed the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–458 §
7210(d)(1), 118 Stat. 3638, 3825 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1225a(a)(4)).
Now, expedited removal proceedings may be applied to individuals who are
apprehended within one hundred miles of the border and are unable to establish
that they have been continuously physically present in the United States for the
preceding fourteen-day period. See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69
Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,879 (Aug. 11, 2004). The statute permits the use of expedited
removal anywhere in the United States within two years of entry, and the Trump
Administration has indicated intent to use the statute as broadly as possible
moving forward. See INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (limiting expedited removal to those
who cannot establish two years of continuous physical presence); Exec. Order No.
13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 25, 2017). For background on the creation of
expedited removal, see generally Cooper, Procedures of Expedited Removal, supra
note 56 (discussing the creation and controversy of expedited removal).
59.
In addition to the laws of the United States, CBP officials are also
obligated to properly conduct a fear screening under international law. The doctrine
of non-refoulement obligates countries to not return individuals to a country where
they would be persecuted or tortured. As a signatory to the 1967 Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees, the United States is obligated to comply with procedures
that ensure that, “No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.” United Nations High Comm’r for
Refugees (UNHCR), Executive Comm., Note on Non-Refoulement (Submitted by
the High Commissioner), U.N. Doc EC/SCP/2 (Aug. 23, 1977). This duty also
includes individuals “who present themselves at [ports of entry] along the U.S.
border” and mandates U.S. officials to not deny the claims of individuals seeking to
cross the border “access to a lawful process to present a claim for asylum.”
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 40, Al Otro Lado v. Kelly, 3:17cv-02366-BAS-KSC (S.D. Cal. 2017).
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1. First-Time Asylum Seekers at the Border: Expedited
Removal and the Credible Fear Interview
According to regulations, CBP officers must conduct a
screening interview with all border arrivals. 60 To protect asylum
seekers and guard against the deportation of individuals with a fear of
return to their country of origin, form I-867A&B, Record of Sworn
Statement in Proceedings, requires officers to ask these four questions:
Why did you leave your home country or country of last
residence?
Do you have any fear or concern about being returned
to your home country or being removed from the United
States?
Would you be harmed if you are returned to your home
country or country of last residence?
Do you have any questions or is there anything you
would like to add?
The law requires CBP officers to refer any individual who
“indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of
persecution” to the Asylum Office for a credible fear interview. 61 If a
CBP officer fails to refer an asylum seeker for a fear interview, that
individual’s expedited removal order will be executed and she will be
returned to her country of origin.
Currently, the training that CBP officers receive regarding the
screening of asylum seekers at the border lacks transparency. The
Field Officer’s Manual, a previous source of guidance to border officials,
was publicly available. Around 2013, however, the Field Officer’s
Manual was rescinded and replaced by the Officer’s Reference Tool,
which has not been made publicly available, despite litigation over its
release and the lack of CBP transparency. 62 Relying on the most recent
60.
8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2) (2018).
61.
INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii).
62.
See Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 306 F.
Supp. 3d 162, 165 (D.D.C. 2018). On March 30, 2018, the court denied DHS’s motion
for summary judgment and ordered the agency to produce the documents
referenced in Chapter 11 of the CBP Officer’s Reference Tool during the summer of
2018. In March 2019, “the Court ordered Defendants to produce a Vaughn index
and additional information about its search for responsive records.” See FOIA
Lawsuit Seeking Disclosure of the CBP Officer’s Reference Tool, AM. IMMIGR.
COUNCIL,
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/litigation/foia-lawsuit-
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publicly available guidance, CBP’s field manual instructs officers to
refer individuals for a credible fear interview whenever the above four
questions elicit an expression of fear. 63 The field manual also instructs
that an officer must refer an individual to an asylum office for a
credible fear interview “if the alien indicates in any fashion or at any
time during the inspections process, that he or she has a fear of
persecution, or that he or she has suffered or may suffer torture.” 64
Border officials are specifically asked to consider “verbal as
well as non-verbal cues” regarding fear in their interactions with
potential asylum seekers. 65 Further, border officials are instructed to
“err on the side of caution, apply the criteria generously, and refer to
the asylum officer any questionable cases.” 66
CBP officials are required to document interactions with
border arrivals, recording the question-and-answer format of the
interview on the required form I-867A&B. 67 This should result in an
accurate, sworn record of any statements made by an individual during

seeking-disclosure-cbp-officers-reference-tool [https://perma.cc/F9ML-CV58]. As
this article went to print, a number of documents were produced in response to the
lawsuit, including one October 2, 2014 memo directing CBP officers to refer asylum
seekers for credible fear interviews. These documents are on file with author and
the Columbia Human Rights Law Review.
63.
CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., INSPECTOR’S
FIELD MANUAL ch. 17.15(b)(1) (2006) [hereinafter INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL],
https://www.aila.org/File/Related/11120959F.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UAN-DFQH];
see also INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii) (discussing when an individual should be referred for
a credible fear interview).
64.
INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 63.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. But see Michele R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, Rules Are Made to Be
Broken: How the Process of Expedited Removal Fails Asylum Seekers, 20 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 167, 187–90 (2006) [hereinafter Pistone & Hoeffner, Rules are Made
to Be Broken] (critiquing CBP’s Field Office Manual for giving conflicting guidance
to officers and encouraging them to consult with the asylum office on “questionable
cases” despite clear guidance elsewhere in the manual requiring them to simply
make the referral for a fear interview if a fear is expressed).
67.
See INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 63 (instructing officers that
they must take a sworn statement using form I-867A&B in all expedited removal
cases); see also INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(ii) (2012)
(“The officer shall prepare a written record of a determination . . . .”) (emphasis
added); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i) (2018) (requiring officers to create a record of the
“facts of the case and statements made by the alien” and to read the statement to
the alien, who must “sign and initial each page of the statement and each
correction”).
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an initial screening interview. 68 This record is supposed to be read and
initialed by the CBP officer and the individual at the border and should
be subject to review by a supervisor. 69
Once an individual expresses a fear, the statute and
regulations require that CBP automatically refer her to the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Asylum Office for a
credible fear interview (CFI). 70 Where fear is expressed, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detains asylum seekers, transporting
them from CBP holding facilities 71 to ICE detention centers, where
they await and undergo the CFI with an asylum officer, who, unlike a
border official, has undergone extensive training in asylum law and
interviewing survivors of trauma. During the CFI, an asylum seeker
must demonstrate a “significant possibility” that she will ultimately
establish eligibility for asylum at a full hearing. 72
As stated by the former Chief of the Asylum and Refugee Law
Division of the Office of the General Counsel and former General
Counsel for the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Owen (“Bo”)
Cooper, “the act of deciding whether a person is a refugee . . . is more

68.
These records may be later used by an immigration judge making a
credibility determination. See Matter of J-C-H-F-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 211, 211 (B.I.A.
2018) (“When deciding whether to consider a border or airport interview in making
a credibility determination, an Immigration Judge should assess the accuracy and
reliability of the interview based on the totality of the circumstances, rather than
relying on any one factor among a list or mandated set of inquiries.”).
69.
INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 63, ch. 17.15(b).
70.
INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii).
71.
Conditions within these CBP holding facilities have been challenged in
both Arizona and Texas. See Doe v. Kelly, 878 F.3d 710, 725 (9th Cir. 2017)
(deciding a class action lawsuit challenging Tucson Sector Border Patrol treatment
of immigrants within CBP holding facilities in violation of the U.S. Constitution
and CBP policy); see also Guillermo Cantor, Am. Immigration Council, Hieleras
(Iceboxes) in the Rio Grande Valley Sector: Lengthy Detention, Deplorable
Conditions, and Abuse in CBP Holding Cells 9–13 (2015), https://www.
americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/hieleras_iceboxes_in_t
he_rio_grande_valley_sector.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP7B-3QT6] (discussing at
length the reports of poor living conditions in CBP holding cells); GUILLERMO
CANTOR & WALTER EWING, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, STILL NO ACTION TAKEN:
COMPLAINTS AGAINST BORDER PATROL AGENTS CONTINUE TO GO UNANSWERED 3–
6 (2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/
still_no_action_taken_complaints_against_border_patrol_agents_continue_to_go_
unanswered.pdf [https://perma.cc/WDV6-9M3J] (discussing systemic failure to
address poor living conditions in CBP holding cells).
72.
INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(v).
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art than science.” 73 USCIS amended the credible fear lesson plan,
which provides guidance for asylum officers conducting credible fear
interviews, in February 2014, 74 tightening the standard for the
credible fear interview, 75 and again in 2017. 76 The idea behind the CFI,
though, is that it is simply a threshold eligibility test and should be
applied generously to identify potential refugees for more in-depth
adjudication. 77
The CFI itself ranges in length and is often conducted by
phone. 78 Although counsel is permitted at the interview, immigrants
are not entitled to government-paid counsel and when lawyers do
appear on behalf of immigrants, they do not play a robust role. 79
73.
See Cooper, Procedures of Expedited Removal, supra note 56, at 1503 (“It
is a predictive exercise demanding hairbreadth judgments about the motivations of
a persecutor, the seriousness of the harm an applicant has suffered or might face,
the likelihood that such harm could take place, the truthfulness of the asylum
seeker, the conditions prevailing in distant countries, and so forth.”).
74.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., RAIO ASYLUM DIVISION
OFFICER TRAINING COURSE: CREDIBLE FEAR 1 (2014), https://www.aila.org/infonet/
uscis-asylum-division-officer-training-course [https://perma.cc/WKJ2-NKFK].
75.
ELIZABETH CASSIDY & TIFFANY LYNCH, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, BARRIERS TO PROTECTION: THE TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN
EXPEDITED REMOVAL 35–36 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 USCIRF REPORT],
https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Barriers%20To%20Protection.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z93Y-F32N].
76.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., RAIO ASYLUM DIVISION
OFFICER TRAINING COURSE: CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION AND TORTURE
DETERMINATIONS 1, 18–20 (2017), https://www.aila.org/infonet/raio-and-asylumdivision-officer-training-course [https://perma.cc/X5A6-BEAJ] (seemingly elevating
the credibility threshold required in credible fear determinations); see also Drake
& Gibson, Vanishing Protection, supra note 6, at 128 (explaining how the credible
fear standard is vague and ambiguous and the new memo no longer urges asylum
officers to err on the side of issuing a positive determination if in doubt).
77.
See Martin, Expedited Removal, infra note 108, at 681–82; see Pistone &
Hoeffner, Rules are Made to Be Broken, supra note 66, at 190; see Cooper,
Procedures of Expedited Removal, supra note 56, at 1503 (“Essentially, the asylum
officer is applying a threshold screening standard to decide whether an asylum
claim holds enough promise that it should be heard through the regular, full process
or whether, instead, the person’s removal should be effected through the expedited
process.”).
78.
The fact that these interviews are often conducted by phone undermines
an asylum officer’s ability to assess tone, demeanor, facial expressions, and other
non-verbal cues that can be so essential to determining credibility and in discussing
sensitive and difficult topics. See 2016 USCIRF REPORT, supra note 75, at 36–37
(raising concerns about quality of telephonic interviews). The regulations governing
the conduct of a CFI can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 208.30 (2018).
79.
INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iv) (2012) (“An alien who
is eligible for such interview may consult with a person or persons of the alien’s
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Indeed, many asylum officers do not permit counsel to interject to
clarify or correct the record, although most do allow the attorney or
representative to make a brief statement at the end of the interview. 80
If the asylum officer determines that the asylum seeker meets
this threshold “credible fear test,” and therefore the asylum seeker has
demonstrated a significant possibility of establishing eligibility for
asylum, the officer issues charging documents in the form of a “Notice
to Appear” (NTA). 81 The NTA lays out the factual and legal allegations
against the asylum seeker and places her in immigration court removal
proceedings, where she may apply for asylum as a defense to removal. 82
That asylum application must be filed in immigration court within one
year of the date of the asylum seeker’s arrival into the United States. 83
choosing prior to the interview or any review thereof . . . .”); see also ASYLUM SEEKER
ADVOCACY PROJECT, VINDICATING THE RIGHTS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AT THE
BORDER AND BEYOND 26–32 (2018), https://asylumadvocacy.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/06/ASAP-Expedited-Removal-Guide.pdf)
[https://perma.cc/224CM9HV] (describing the attorney’s role in a credible fear interview).
80.
See 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d)(4) (“Any person or persons with whom the alien
chooses to consult may be present at the interview and may be permitted, in the
discretion of the asylum officer, to present a statement at the end of the interview.”).
81.
Notably, even if the asylum officer believes that the individual is subject
to one or more of the mandatory bars to applying for or being granted asylum under
INA § 208(a)(2) and (b)(2), he should still place the individual in removal
proceedings under § 240 for “full consideration of the alien’s claim.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.30(e)(5). An individual subject to reinstatement does not get this chance.
82.
Many of these Notices to Appear are issued without a specific date and
time to appear in immigration court. The Supreme Court has recently found such
NTAs insufficient and may call into question immigration court jurisdiction. See
Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). For asylum applicants, this could
arguably mean they can seek to have their claims adjudicated before the asylum
office with USCIS rather than the immigration courts through the Executive Office
of Immigration Review.
83.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2)(A) (2018). Although the asylum seeker is not
informed of the one-year filing deadline for asylum, she is obligated to submit an I589 Application for Asylum within one year of her most recent entry into the United
States in immigration court. See Harris, The One-Year Bar, supra note 16 at
1213–24 (describing the 2016 policy change regarding filing an asylum application
in immigration court and providing two examples of the difficulties facing asylum
seekers in meeting this deadline operationally); see also Mendez-Rojas v. Johnson,
No. 2:16-cv-01024-RSM (W.D. Wash. June 30, 2016) (granting summary judgment
in class action litigation to asylum-seeking plaintiffs, requiring the government to
provide notice to all asylum seekers of the one-year filing deadline and to adopt
uniform procedural mechanisms to permit class members to timely file their
applications). It is also important to note that even where an individual has
received a positive CFI, she may decide, based on various factors (including, in some
cases, the prospect of prolonged detention) to accept a removal order. See, e.g., Mejia
v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 573, 577 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining how an asylum seeker’s
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One hundred fifty days after the asylum application is filed, asylum
seekers may apply for a work permit, which can be granted when the
asylum application has been pending for at least 180 days, but USCIS
typically takes several months to issue employment authorization
documents. 84
If the asylum-seeking individual does not receive a positive
result following a CFI, she has the opportunity to go before an
immigration judge for a negative credible fear review, which must take
place within seven days of the initial CFI decision. 85 The asylum seeker
remains detained during this time period. 86 Counsel may be present,
but may not actually enter an appearance for a negative credible fear
review, 87 and some judges do not allow any attorney participation. The
immigration judge reviews the decision of the asylum officer de novo
and decides whether to affirm or vacate the decision. If the decision is
affirmed, no additional judicial review of an expedited removal order is
permitted, and the asylum seeker is typically quickly removed from the
United States. 88 If the judge decides that the applicant has a credible
fear of persecution, they are placed in removal proceedings before an
prior removal order came after the immigration judge warned her that she had a
“serious” credibility problem which would be “extremely difficult to overcome,” so
that she declined to apply for relief and accepted her removal order).
84.
EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW & U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., THE 180-DAY ASYLUM EAD CLOCK NOTICE (2017),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%
20Asylum/Asylum/Asylum_Clock_Joint_Notice_-_revised_05-10-2017.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7SWM-W7XY].
85.
INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III) (2012); 8
C.F.R § 1003.42(e) (2018).
86.
INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).
87.
The Executive Office for Immigration Review provides that, while the
non-citizen is entitled to consult with a person of their choosing before the credible
fear review and that person may also be present during the review, the non-citizen
“is not represented at the credible fear review. Accordingly, persons acting on the
alien’s behalf are not entitled to make opening statements, call and question
witnesses, conduct cross examinations, object to evidence, or make closing
arguments.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE., EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL ch. 7.4(d)(iv)(c) (2017) [hereinafter
IMMIGRATION COURT MANUAL].
88.
However, at various stages in the history of family detention, advocates
have had some success filing a request for reconsideration (RFR) with the asylum
office following a judge’s affirming of a negative CFI or RFI. This is based on
the asylum office’s regulatory authority to reconsider. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A) (2018). In response to this filing, the asylum office has,
somewhat inconsistently, asked ICE to effectuate a stay while the RFR has been
considered, and at times has granted an RFR and given a new interview to the
asylum seeker, which can result in a positive credible fear finding.
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immigration judge, where the applicant can apply for asylum as a
defense to removal.
All of the above describes how the expedited removal system is
supposed to work. 89 However, much of this process takes place behind
closed doors with no internal or external oversight. When researchers
have been allowed access to the process, they have found that expedited
removal operates much differently in practice. This Article focuses on
what happens when the system does not function as it should and
asylum seekers are not referred for a credible fear interview and are
instead issued an expedited removal order. This is discussed in Part B
below, after a discussion of what happens to an asylum seeker entering
after a first attempt to seek asylum has resulted in an expedited
removal order. Upon attempted reentry, these individuals are at
serious risk of being subjected to reinstatement of removal, thus losing
their ability to apply for asylum.

2. Asylum Seekers Entering a Second or Subsequent Time,
Reinstatement of Removal, and the Reasonable
Fear Interview
The process is quite different for someone entering the United
States who already has a removal order and is attempting to reenter
without inspection. Such an individual is subject to detention and
“reinstatement” of the original removal order. 90 These individuals are
provided with a reasonable—rather than credible—fear interview, and
if successful, they are referred to “withholding only” proceedings. 91
There are significant differences between credible and
reasonable fear interviews (RFIs). Those subject to reinstatement of
removal because of a prior removal order must meet a higher burden
of proof, establishing a “reasonable possibility” of eligibility for
withholding protection, to receive a positive determination following
an RFI. 92 Specifically, the applicant must establish that she has a
“reasonable possibility” that she would be persecuted on account of
89.
For more details on how the phases of expedited removal work, including
credible or reasonable fear interviews and review of negative determinations in
immigration court, see Manning & Hong, Access to Counsel, supra note 32, at
684–87.
90.
See INA § 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012). Prosecution of that
individual for illegal re-entry is also increasingly likely under 8 U.S.C. § 1326
(2012).
91.
See INA § 241(b)(3).
92.
See 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c), (g) (2018).
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race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion, or that she would be tortured in the country of
removal. 93
If the asylum-seeking individual does not receive a positive
result following the reasonable fear interview, she has the opportunity
to go before an immigration judge for a negative reasonable fear
review, which must take place within ten days. 94 Unlike credible fear
reviews, representation of counsel is actually permitted for reasonable
fear review. 95 Just like a credible fear review, the immigration judge
reviews the negative decision of the asylum officer de novo and decides
whether to affirm or vacate the decision. 96 If the decision is affirmed,
no additional judicial review is permitted, and the asylum seeker is
typically quickly removed again from the United States. 97
If the judge vacates the negative reasonable fear decision,
or if the asylum officer’s initial decision is positive, immigration
officials issue a Form I-863 Notice of Referral into withholding-only
proceedings with the pre-existing removal order attached. Typically,
individuals in reinstatement and withholding-only proceedings are not
released from detention to pursue their claims. 98 Historically, those
who pass a CFI have had more success securing parole and release to
pursue an asylum claim outside of detention. 99
93.
Id. at § 208.31(c). In the author’s experience, with a CFI, USCIS will
permit a law student or other non-attorney consultant to be present within the
interview, but with an RFI, if an attorney is on record with a Notice of Appearance,
USCIS requires the attorney to be present at the interview, rather than a law
student or non-attorney supervised by that attorney.
94.
Id. at § 208.31(g).
95.
See IMMIGRATION COURT MANUAL, supra note 87, ch. 7.4(e)(iv)(c)
(“Subject to the Immigration Judge’s discretion, the alien may be represented
during the reasonable fear review at no expense to the government.”).
96.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(d) (2018); see also Office of the Chief Immigration
Judge, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, OPERATING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MEMORANDUM
NO. 99-5 IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE UN CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE 6–7, 8 (1999), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/
1999/06/01/99_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/DCS5-P5DW] (explaining that in both
credible and reasonable fear review, immigration judges must make de novo fear
determinations).
97.
8 C.F.R. § 208.31(g)(1).
98.
See supra note 27.
99.
This is not, however, consistent, and recent actions by the Attorney
General and the Administration make it clear that the government seeks to detain
asylum seekers for the pendency of their asylum proceedings. As this article went
to print the Attorney General issued Matter of M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509 (A.G. 2019)
(holding that an individual who passed a credible fear interview is ineligible for
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This means that a withholding-only applicant bears several
disadvantages. First, she has to meet a higher burden of proof, to show
that it is more likely than not that she would face a threat to her life
or freedom if removed to the country of feared harm. 100 Second, she will
have to make this claim from a detained setting. Aside from the
physical and psychological disadvantages of detention, particularly for
individuals fleeing persecution, 101 detention poses practical barriers to
finding and obtaining supporting evidence. 102 Furthermore, access to
counsel is dramatically diminished in detention. 103

release on bond). This decision is being challenged in litigation in the Western
District of Washington. See Padilla v. ICE, No. 2:18-cv-928 MJP (W.D. Wash. filed
June 25, 2018). The Administration has also proposed regulations to hold children
seeking asylum indefinitely. See Apprehension, Care, and Custody of Alien Minors
and Unaccompanied Alien Children, 83 Fed. Reg. 45486 (Sept. 7, 2018) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 410, 8 C.F.R. pts. 212, 236) (overriding the Flores
settlement to allow children to remain detained with their parents for the duration
of removal proceedings).
100. INA §241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012) (“[T]he Attorney General
may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the
alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s
race, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”).
101. See generally, G.J. Coffey et al., The Meaning and Mental Health
Consequences of Long-Term Immigration Detention for People Seeking Asylum, 70
SOC. SCI. & MED. 2070 (2010) (examining the psychological consequences of
immigration detention); Allen S. Keller et al., Mental Health of Detained Asylum
Seekers, 362 THE LANCET 1721 (2003) (assessing symptoms of anxiety, depression,
and PTSD in detained asylum seekers); PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS &
BELLEVUE/NYU PROGRAM FOR SURVIVORS OF TORTURE, FROM PERSECUTION TO
PRISON: THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF DETENTION FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS (2003),
https://phr.org/wp-content/uploads/2003/06/persecution-to-prison-US-2003.pdf
[https://perma.cc/34MK-3ZRU] (describing the traumatic effects of detention on
adults); CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE ET AL., TORTURED AND DETAINED: SURVIVOR
STORIES OF U.S. IMMIGRATION DET. 10 (2013), https://www.cvt.org/sites/
default/files/Report_TorturedAndDetained_Nov2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/K668LMC9] (reporting on personal and psychological impact of detention experience);
accord US: Trauma in Family Immigration Detention, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(May
15,
2015),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/15/us-trauma-familyimmigration-detention [https://perma.cc/DC2Q-F3EJ] (same).
102.
See, e.g., Barbara Hines, An Overview of U.S. Immigration Law and
Policy Since 9/11, 12 TEX. HISP. J. L. & POL’Y 9, 20 (2006) (“It is much harder to
represent a detained client in immigration court than one who has been released
on bond because of issues such as jail access and the client’s ability to obtain
necessary evidence and witnesses to support his or her claims.”).
103.
See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to
Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 42 (2015) [hereinafter Eagly &
Shafer, Access to Counsel in Immigration Court]; see also Lindsay M. Harris,
Contemporary Family Detention and Legal Advocacy, 21 HARV. LATINX L. REV. 135,
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Even if a withholding-only applicant is fortunate enough to be
released from detention, she will have difficulty supporting herself
while she awaits adjudication of her claim. Unlike asylum applicants,
who are able to apply for employment authorization after their
applications have been pending for 150 days, withholding applicants
do not technically have this right until after they are granted
protection. 104 Given the immigration court backlogs, adjudication of a
non-detained withholding-only claim may take several years. 105
During this time, a withholding-only applicant without work
authorization will struggle to support herself, living in the shadows,
and, like asylum seekers, will be ineligible for any public assistance.
All of this—the increased difficulty of winning withholding
protection, the increased likelihood of detention, and the ultimate
insufficiency of the protection awarded 106 if successful—stems from the
initial expedited removal order and the subsequent reinstatement of
removal. As discussed in the next section, the issuance of many of the
underlying expedited removal orders that lead to reinstatement, and
thus ineligibility for asylum, is highly problematic.

160–63 (2018) (explaining the consequences arising from lack of access to legal
counsel for detained clients).
104.
The instructions of the I-765 Application for Employment Authorization
form do provide a category for “applicants for asylum and withholding of removal.”
Similarly, the form upon which one applies for withholding, I-589, is the same form
as used for asylum applicants. As such, many attorneys, including the author, have
successfully obtained work permits for withholding-only applicants while they are
awaiting adjudication of their claims in immigration court. However, this is not
consistent. According to the Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum for
immigration courts, there is no asylum clock for applications for withholding or
CAT. See Memorandum from the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice on Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 13-02: The Asylum
Clock (2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/12/03/1302.pdf [https://perma.cc/T94K-ZGBA]. Thus, some court administrators never start
the “clock,” so that when withholding-only grantees apply for work authorization,
USCIS denies their applications.
105.
See Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGRATION,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/ [https://perma.cc/8WV5W9FA] (reflecting an average of more than 750 days for adjudication of immigration
court cases nationwide); see also Harris, The One Year Bar, supra note 16, at 1205
n.94 (pointing out that TRAC’s numbers only reflect average, not total wait times
for adjudication, and that in September 2015 actual full adjudication of backlogged
cases would take “between 659 and 2,401 days”).
106.
See infra notes 140–48 and accompanying text.
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B. How the Expedited Removal System Functions in Reality:
Rampant Abuse of Expedited Removal at the Border
The statutorily mandated credible fear process does not always
operate according to law, and some asylum-seeking families and
individuals, like Cecilia, are wrongfully removed without a credible or
reasonable fear interview. Indeed, problems with the expedited
removal system have been clear from the very beginning. 107 The
architects of the expedited removal system, and those who initially
applauded its creation, assumed that where fear was expressed, CBP
officers would refer asylum seekers for the appropriate fear-based
interview. 108 This assumption was woefully unfounded.
Numerous reports from governmental and non-governmental
bodies have sounded the alarm on U.S. failures to meet the
international obligation to protect refugees and adhere to the principle
of non-refoulement. 109 As discussed below, in practice, the expedited
107.
Karen Musalo et al., The Expedited Removal Study: Report on the First
Three Years of Implementation of Expedited Removal, 15 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y. 1, 1 (2001); Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The New Asylum
Rule: Improved But Still Unfair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 2–4, 32–62 (2001); Pistone
& Hoeffner, Rules are Made to Be Broken, supra note 66, at 175–84 (2006) (outlining
seven key errors and problems with the expedited removal system as applied to
asylum seekers from more than a decade ago).
108.
See Cooper, Procedures of Expedited Removal, supra note 56, at 1514,
1516, 1523 (describing expedited removal procedures in detail with the assumption
that all the required steps will be undertaken and fear will be recorded accurately,
and discussing the credible fear standard with an assumption that all genuine
asylum seekers would get to that step in the process). David Martin, who was
heavily involved in the establishment of the expedited removal system, assumes
throughout his article that officers consistently ask the fear-based questions and
accurately record an individual’s responses. See David Martin, Two Cheers for
Expedited Removal in the New Immigration Laws, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 672, 691 (2000)
[hereinafter Martin, Expedited Removal] (“Someone who simply mentions a fear of
return or the wish for asylum is handed over for the credible fear interview and
given at least 48 hours to prepare.”); RANDY CAPPS, FAYE HIPSMAN & DORIS
MEISSNER, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., ADVANCES IN U.S.-MEXICO BORDER
ENFORCEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE CONSEQUENCE DELIVERY SYSTEM 5 (2017), https:
//www.migrationpolicy.org/research/advances-us-mexico-border-enforcementreview-consequence-delivery-system [https://perma.cc/M74L-79KD] (explaining
that the “assumptions of effectiveness and deterrence” consequence delivery
system, which includes expedited removal and reinstatement of removal, “may be
less applicable” since “new and diverse migrant populations, particularly women
and children fleeing violence in Central America, have begun to emerge alongside
the traditional group of economic migrants . . . .”).
109.
See ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE: RAPID DEPORTATIONS THAT BYPASS THE
COURTROOM 4, 99–100 (2014) [hereinafter ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE],
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removal system tramples intended safeguards for asylum seekers as
large numbers of applicants are improperly placed in expedited
removal without being told of their right to seek fear-based relief,
without being able to read and review essential forms, and even in spite
of expressing fear of return.
For example, at the behest of Congress, the U.S. Commission
on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) issued three reports on
the expedited removal system, the first of which was written after
USCIRF was given unprecedented access to border patrol interviews
and documents. The first groundbreaking report, released in 2005,
raised serious concerns about the integrity of the expedited removal
system and the protection of asylum seekers. 110 In particular, following
actual observation of border officials on the job, the study found that in
50% of the expedited removal interviews USCIRF observed, border
officials failed to inform individuals that they could ask for protection
if they feared return. 111 In 72% of cases, individuals were not given the
opportunity to read and review forms before they were signed. 112
Finally, in 15% of the interviews observed, asylum seekers who
expressed fear were deported without a fear interview, despite the fact
that half of those files actually reflected the expression of fear. 113 Since
the 2005 release of the first USCIRF report, no organization has been
given access to border patrol practices or been allowed to observe
credible fear interviews.
The 2005 report made several recommendations to improve
expedited removal, all designed to ensure that victims of human rights
abuses would have access to asylum protection. However, two years
https://www.aclu.org/report/american-exile-rapid-deportations-bypass-courtroom
[https://perma.cc/R8UR-5BAP] (explaining the right to apply for asylum and for
protection from persecution under international law and norms); CLARA LONG,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “YOU DON'T HAVE RIGHTS HERE:” US BORDER SCREENING
AND RETURNS OF CENTRAL AMERICANS TO RISK OF SERIOUS HARM 6, 8 (2014)
[hereinafter HRW, YOU DON'T HAVE RIGHTS HERE], http://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/us1014_web_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/LMB6-T9G2].
110.
MARK HETFIELD ET AL., U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,
REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL: VOL. I: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 50–62 (2005); MARK HETFIELD ET AL., U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL: VOL.
II: EXPERT REPORTS 33 (2005). For detailed summaries of these three reports, see
Manning & Hong, Access to Counsel, supra note 32, at 689–91; see also Frost,
Learning from our Mistakes, supra note 40, at 781–82 (describing the disparity in
outcomes between individuals who receive legal assistance and those who do not).
111.
ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 109, at 43.
112.
Id.
113.
Id.
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later, USCIRF’s 2007 annual report gave CBP an “F” because of a total
lack of response to USCIRF’s 2005 recommendations. 114
In 2014, several NGOs released reports on expedited removal,
all based on interviews with individuals who had gone through the
process. A 2014 report from Human Rights Watch (HRW) shared the
findings of interviews with Hondurans who were subjected to
expedited removal and deported:
Many said that they had expressed their fears to US
Border Patrol officers charged with screening for fear
of return before being deported, but fewer than half of
these were referred by US Border Patrol for a further
assessment of whether they had a ‘credible’ or
‘reasonable’ fear of returning to Honduras. 115
Indeed, HRW reports that “the migrants we interviewed said
that the CBP officers whom they encountered seemed singularly
focused on removing them from the United States, which impeded their
ability to make their fears known.” 116 A 2014 report from the ACLU,
based on interviews with 89 individuals who had received summary
removal orders, reported that 55% were never asked about their
fear of persecution. 117 Similarly, a 2014 report from the American
Immigration Council details problems with CBP failing to ask the
required questions about fear, ignoring fear when expressed, and
rapidly conducting interviews without confidentiality and without
proper interpretation. 118
The most recent USCIRF report from 2016 was the result of
field research and a review of public information. 119 The report
114.
U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT 59 (2007),
http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/AR_2007/annualreport2007.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M7QU-4DHH].
115.
See HRW, YOU DON'T HAVE RIGHTS HERE, supra note 109, at 8.
116.
Id. at 8.
117.
See ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 109, at 4.
118.
SARA CAMPOS & JOAN FRIEDLAND, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL,
MEXICAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN ASYLUM AND CREDIBLE FEAR CLAIMS 9–11
(2014),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/mexican-andcentral-american-asylum-and-credible-fear-claims-background-and-context
[https://perma.cc/YF6N-VDQM].
119.
This included primary observations of individuals subject to the
expedited removal process, interviews with asylum seekers, meetings with
government officials and advocates, and meetings with officials at five ports of
entry, four border patrol stations, and five asylum offices, along with inspections of
15 detention centers around the United States between 2012 and 2015. See 2016

2019]

Withholding Protection

35

highlighted instances where CBP officers neglected to read back
answers to the individual or permit the individual to correct errors on
the forms. 120 Further, CBP officers failed to record articulated fear and
had pre-populated responses to questions on the forms by copying and
pasting from prepared text. 121 USCIRF reports that a key finding was:
[C]ontinuing and new concerns about CBP officers’
interviewing practices and the reliability of the records
they create, including: flawed Border Patrol internal
guidance that conflates CBP’s role with that of USCIS;
certain CBP officers’ outright skepticism, if not
hostility, toward asylum claims; and inadequate
quality assurance procedures. 122
USCIRF expressed concern about “virtual processing” of
individuals in expedited removal. This refers to interviews conducted
via videoconference by agents located at a different facility, which
raises concerns about privacy and the ability to communicate. Also
distressing is the use of interviewing “templates” from which officers
copy and paste answers. 123
Existing scholarship has examined some failures of the
expedited removal system, including touching on how the system fails
asylum seekers, 124 but this Article is the first to fully explore the
interaction between expedited removal and reinstatement of removal
to block asylum seekers from meaningful protection, relegating them
to withholding protection only. Other scholars have highlighted the
problems surrounding the screening of asylum seekers in expedited
USCIRF REPORT, supra note 75, at 9 (describing the methodology informing the
report’s findings).
120.
Id. at 19.
121.
Id. at 24–25.
122.
Id. at 2.
123.
Id. at 24–25.
124.
See, e.g., Manning & Hong, Access to Counsel, supra note 32, at 680–82,
690; Frost, Learning From Our Mistakes, supra note 40, at 775 (giving the example
of a Mexican asylum seeker whose fear was articulated, but the CBP officer
erroneously determined he was ineligible for asylum because he feared harm from
private actors and he was prosecuted for illegal entry and removed). Even David
Martin, whose 2000 article applauds the expedited removal system, recognized
back then some of the problems involved. Martin, Expedited Removal, supra note
108, at 696–97 (“[T]here have been claims that abusive, ill-trained, or ill-motivated
inspectors or interpreters have sometimes deliberately ignored or blown past an
assertion of feared persecution, and then issued an expedited removal order without
referral to an asylum officer.”).
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removal. 125 The decisions are made by border officials, who are
“generally not lawyers and who (unlike [immigration judges]) do not
take oaths to do justice or maintain impartiality.” 126 Further, these
officers “typically operate within agency cultures that prioritize
enforcement,” rather than protection. 127
The full scope of this problem is not exactly clear. As one
scholar has explained, this is because, conveniently, “the government
does not keep records of its mistakes.” 128
The problems for asylum seekers, however, continue beyond
simply being turned back at the border.
Expedited removal can mean serious and even deadly
consequences for any deported migrant, and particularly so for a
wrongfully removed asylum seeker. 129 As the 2014 HRW report details,
several of the Hondurans interviewed had been subjected to further
violence after their expressed fear was ignored and they were
expeditiously removed from the United States. 130 Additional problems
are present when asylum seekers are turned away from the Mexican
border and urged to seek asylum in Mexico. As the American
Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) has explained, “in Mexico,
asylum seekers and other migrants face the threat of kidnapping,
sexual assault, and other harm and are consistently targeted on the
basis of race, nationality, sexual orientation, and other protected
grounds.” 131
125.
Koh, Removal in the Shadows, supra note 32, at 198–200; see also Koh,
Searching for Solutions, supra note 32, at 349–56.
126.
See Koh, Removal in the Shadows, supra note 32, at 230.
127.
See id. at 231 (citing Nina Rabin, Victims or Criminals? Discretion,
Sorting, and Bureaucratic Culture in the U.S. Immigration System, 23 S. CAL. REV.
L & SOC. JUST. 195, 199 (2014)); see also Pistone & Hoeffner, Rules are Made to Be
Broken, supra note 66, at 196 (recognizing that “the culture in which expedited
removal occurs is an enforcement culture”).
128.
Frost, Learning from Our Mistakes, supra note 40, at 782.
129.
HRF, CROSSING THE LINE, supra note 6, at 6 (reporting that the MS
gang murdered a Honduran man two weeks after his deportation); see ACLU,
AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 109, at 4 (detailing several gang rapes, shootings,
kidnapping, sex trafficking, and murders following deportation).
130.
HRW, YOU DON'T HAVE RIGHTS HERE, supra note 109, at 15–19.
131. AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N., AILA POLICY BRIEF: NEW BARRIERS
AT THE BORDER IMPEDE DUE PROCESS AND ACCESS TO ASYLUM, Doc. No. 18060102
3
(2018),
https://www.aila.org/infonet/policy-brief-new-barriers-at-the-border
[https://perma.cc/TL2P-L6Z9]; see also HRF, CROSSING THE LINE, supra note 6, at
16–18 (detailing the danger asylum seekers face along with a lack of protection in
Mexico); see also AMNESTY INT’L., FACING WALLS: USA AND MEXICO’S VIOLATIONS
OF THE RIGHTS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 19–22 (2017), https://www.amnestyusa.org/
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Asylum seekers like Cecilia who make a repeat attempt to seek
protection in the United States are forever marked with the stain of a
removal order. This renders the asylum seeker ineligible for asylum
protection and eligible only for withholding of removal or relief under
the Convention Against Torture. The next section discusses how these
forms of relief fail to meet the needs of asylum seekers and do not
provide meaningful protection.

C. Grave Consequences of the Interplay Between Reinstatement
and the Expedited Removal System
Having examined the failures of the expedited removal system
for asylum seekers, it is critical to understand the consequences of
those erroneously issued removal orders. To this date, federal circuit
courts have universally found that asylum seekers with prior removal
orders, expedited or otherwise, and who have been subject to
reinstatement after entering again without inspection are categorically
ineligible for asylum protection. 132
This leaves asylum seekers like Cecilia with the inferior
protection options of withholding of removal and relief under the
Convention Against Torture. These forms of protection require the
individual to meet a higher burden of proof while offering fewer
benefits. For an asylum claimant, the Supreme Court has recognized
that a chance of future persecution as low as 10% would constitute a

wp-content/uploads/2017/06/USA-Mexico-Facing-Walls-REPORT-ENG.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/8NSJ-FKPY] (describing the devastating impact of new policies and
practices leading to asylum seekers “pursuing increasingly more desperate and
dangerous means of crossing the border”); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, DANGEROUS
TERRITORY: MEXICO STILL NOT SAFE FOR REFUGEES (2017), http://www.human
rightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-Mexico-Asylum-System-rep.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/ER9J-X227]. Problematic conditions for asylum seekers in Mexico have
been further highlighted in the litigation challenging the “Remain in Mexico”
policy. See Complaint, supra note 5, at 2. Indeed, in December 2018, two Honduran
teens were killed in Tijuana. See Mary Beth Sheridan & Kevin Shief, Two
Honduran Teens from Caravan Killed in Tijuana, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/two-honduran-teens-from-migrant-carava
n-are-killed-in-tijuana/2018/12/19/5ba8f824-03aa-11e9-958c-0a601226ff6b_story.h
tml (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review).
132.
See Wadhia, Speed Deportations, supra note 32, at 11–12 (discussing
withholding-only proceedings). This Article focuses on the interplay between
reinstatement and asylum protection, but it should be noted that those subject to
reinstatement are also subject to potential prosecution for illegal re-entry,
particularly under the current administration’s “zero tolerance” policy and to other
bars to admission. See Attorney General Announces Zero-Tolerance, supra note 49.

38

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[50.3

well-founded fear to satisfy that element of the asylum definition. 133
For an individual who is ineligible for asylum and seeking withholding,
however, the likelihood of harm (a threat to the individual’s life or
freedom) must be more likely than not—a 51% probability threshold. 134
Cecilia, for example, had to show in her withholding-only proceedings
that the father of her children was more likely than not going to kill or
harm her again, rather than there being just a “reasonable possibility”
(10% or greater chance) of that harm.
This heightened burden of proof means that one who would
have otherwise been eligible for asylum may be returned to face
danger. Further, the likelihood of detention for withholding-only
applicants dramatically reduces their chances of success on the merits,
again increasing the chances that an individual who faces persecution
will be returned to danger. 135 Detention decreases access to counsel, in
a situation in which access to counsel overwhelmingly improves an
individual’s chances of obtaining relief and release from detention. 136
For detained immigrants specifically, a national study showed that
“the odds were almost eleven times greater than those with counsel (as
compared to those without) sought relief, three times greater that they
successfully obtained relief, and a little over four times greater that
they had their case terminated.” 137 Even where an individual is
granted withholding of removal in a detained setting, she may be
detained for several months following the grant while ICE tries to
see whether another country would be willing to accept her for
admission. 138
Aside from the heightened burden of proof and the increased
likelihood of detention during the adjudication of the protection claim,
an individual is substantively far worse off than an individual granted
asylum, when she is granted withholding.
133.
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987).
134.
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424 (1984).
135.
See ACLU FACT SHEET: WITHHOLDING ONLY CASES AND DETENTION,
supra note 27 (reporting that in 95% of withholding-only cases, the individual is
detained throughout the adjudication of his claim).
136.
Eagly & Shafer, Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, supra note
103, at 35, 42 (finding that only 14% of detained immigrants are represented,
according to data from 2007–2012).
137.
Id. at 57.
138.
See, e.g., PA. STATE UNIV. DICKINSON SCH. OF LAW CTR. FOR
IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS, WITHHOLDING-ONLY PROCEEDINGS TOOLKIT 33–35 (2014),
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/Immigrants/Withh
olding-Only-Toolkit.pdf [https://perma.cc/NDD6-A62L] (discussing the ongoing
detention of individuals granted withholding of removal).
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First, unlike asylees, who can petition for spouses and
unmarried children under the age of twenty-one, withholding grantees
do not benefit from family reunification. This leaves Cecilia
permanently separated from her young son. Further, withholding
grantees are unable to travel outside the United States, which can
undermine not only personal freedom of movement but also
professional opportunities. If Cecilia had been granted asylum, she
could have applied immediately for her young son to join her in the
United States as a derivative, and, while she waited for his petition to
be processed (potentially for months or years), 139 she could have
applied for a refugee travel document to visit him overseas. 140
Second, withholding grantees are not eligible for some of the
benefits available to asylees, including refugee medical assistance (a
form of temporary insurance), refugee cash assistance, and services
such as case management that may be available through voluntary
agencies contracted with the Office of Refugee Resettlement within the
Department of Health and Human Services. 141
Third, withholding grantees live in limbo. Asylees are eligible
to apply for permanent residence (often colloquially referred to as a
“green card”) one year after the asylum grant. 142 Four years after
receiving permanent residence, asylees can apply for U.S. citizenship.
In contrast, withholding grantees will never become permanent
residents or citizens. 143 Permanent residence comes with various

139.
Harris, From Surviving to Thriving, supra note 14, at 76–78.
140.
An asylee (an individual who has been granted asylum) would be able
to travel overseas to any country (subject, potentially, to visa requirements) other
than their country of origin. Returning to the country of feared persecution could
constitute “reavailment” under the statute. Reavailment means that an asylee has
availed herself of the protection of the country of feared persecution, such as by
traveling to the country of origin, renewing a passport, or other similar actions. See
INA § 208(c)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2)(D) (2012).
141.
For a full discussion of the benefits for which asylees are eligible, and
some of the struggles asylees face after the asylum grant, see Harris, From
Surviving to Thriving, supra note 14; see also Wadhia, Speed Deportations, supra
note 32, at 13 (discussing some differences in benefits between asylees and persons
granted withholding of removal).
142.
8 C.F.R. § 209.2(a) (2018); Eligibility Requirements, USCIS POLICY
MANUAL (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/Print/PolicyManualVolume7-PartM-Chapter2.html [https://perma.cc/PPB4-B2YD].
143.
See generally CHERI ATTIX, AM. IMMIGR. LAW. ASS’N, PRACTICE
POINTER: UNDERSTANDING WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL, AILA DOC. 14021344 at 2
(Apr. 2, 2014), https://www.aila.org/infonet/uscis-understanding-withholding-ofremoval (on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (explaining the
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rights, including, critically, the rights to petition for other family
members and to become eligible for federal financial aid for
education. 144 When permanent residents become U.S. citizens, they
gain the right to vote and hold office. 145
Further, withholding grantees are often ordered to continue to
attend mandatory check-ins with a deportation officer, which vary in
frequency from weekly to annually. 146 These check-ins, requiring the
individual to physically appear at an ICE office, can be burdensome as
they require travel, sometimes to faraway locations, and taking time
off work. For someone granted withholding because they fear a threat
to their life or freedom, it may also be anxiety-provoking to periodically
appear at an ICE office. Withholding grantees must renew their work
authorization cards every single year. 147 This temporary work permit
may undermine an individual’s ability to gain employment as
employers may be nervous about the temporary nature of the
authorization to work. Further, withholding of removal simply means
that the individual’s removal is withheld from the specific country of
feared persecution; should conditions in that country change or ICE
find another country to accept the withholding grantee, she may be
deported elsewhere. 148
limitations of withholding of removal); Withholding of Removal and CAT, supra
note 25.
144.
See Welcome to the United States: A Guide for New Immigrants, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. 14, 66 (2015), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/
files/files/nativedocuments/M-618.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5RN-AVBD] (providing
information on settling in the United States including information on available
benefits).
145.
Id. at 98–99.
146.
A judge must first issue a removal order before granting withholding of
removal. See, e.g., Matter of I-S- & C-S-, 24 I & N Dec. 432, 434 (B.I.A. 2008). Thus,
just like any other immigrant subject to a removal order, a withholding applicant
must continue to report to ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations for check-in
appointments.
147.
See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(10) (2018) (deeming withholding of
deportation grantees eligible for work authorization). The regulation provides that
“USCIS may, in its discretion, determine the validity period assigned to any
document issued evidencing an alien’s authorization to work in the United States.”
Id. § 274a.12(a). That period for withholding grantees is currently one year. See
Withholding of Removal and CAT, supra note 25 (“A person granted withholding of
removal is required to pay a yearly renewal fee for an employment authorization
document in order to maintain the legal right to work in the United States.”).
148.
“An alien . . . granted withholding of removal or deportation . . . may not
be deported or removed to the country to which his or her deportation or removal is
ordered withheld . . . unless the withholding order is terminated . . . .” 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.22 (2018). It is current ICE practice to require withholding grantees to apply
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The differences in protection, opportunity, and the potential for
integration and stability for asylees versus those granted withholding
or CAT protection are profound. And that fork in the road comes most
often during the very first interaction an asylum seeker has with the
U.S. immigration system, the result of a split-second decision made by
a low-level border official. If the CBP officer encounters an asylum
seeker and follows the law correctly, the asylum seeker should be
referred for a credible fear interview and end up in asylum proceedings.
If that officer fails to follow the law correctly, the asylum seeker will
be quickly removed and then subject to reinstatement of removal and
ineligible for asylum if she tries to illegally enter again. While it seems
that an erroneous removal order should be easy to remedy, in reality it
is a permanent stain on the asylum seeker’s record, incredibly unlikely
ever to be removed despite various efforts and tactics undertaken by
creative attorneys, as discussed below.

II. LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS FOR ABUSE OF
EXPEDITED REMOVAL
Given the already widespread use of expedited removal and its
anticipated expansion, the problematic ways in which it affects asylum
seekers must be addressed. Immigration judges lack the authority to
consider an individual eligible for asylum without a Notice to Appear
in INA Section 240 proceedings, which, as explained above, is not given
to those in withholding-only proceedings. 149 Thus, immigration judges
lack the power to remedy the injustice caused by an erroneously issued
expedited removal order that has been subsequently reinstated. The
avenues for relief lie with immigration officials, who have discretionary
power to remedy the situation.
The existing methods of discretionary relief through one of two
immigration agencies are discussed below. Prosecutorial discretion is
the power that an agency or individual officer has to decide which

to at least three other countries for residence or admission. In Cecilia’s case, for
example, after her withholding grant in April 2018, ICE ordered her to apply to
three consulates for admission to their countries. See INA § 241(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(1)(C) (2012) (laying out alternate countries to which an individual may
be removed). Withholding may also be revoked if the grantee’s life or freedom would
no longer be threatened because country conditions have changed. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.24(b)(1) (2018).
149.
8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b), (c)(2) (2018); see also id. § 208.31(g)(2)(i) (“The
immigration judge shall consider only the alien’s application for withholding of
removal . . . .”).
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charges to bring and how to pursue a particular case. 150 In the
immigration context, prosecutorial discretion exists at many levels
throughout the system. This Part outlines two existing strategies to
challenge an erroneously issued expedited removal order, including
(1) asking CBP to reopen and rescind the removal order, and (2) asking
the ICE trial attorney with the Office of Chief Counsel to exercise
discretion to issue a Notice to Appear, rather than accepting CBP’s
reinstatement of the removal order and issuing a Notice of Referral to
withholding-only proceedings. In the current political climate, neither
remedy is effective. Federal court challenges are also limited due to
strict jurisdictional provisions, and these are discussed below in Part
C.

A. Asking CBP to Reopen and Rescind Underlying Expedited
Removal Orders
A logical first step in challenging an erroneously issued
removal order is contacting the agency responsible for issuing that
order. CBP officers are not required by law to reinstate prior removal
orders against individuals who enter without inspection. 151 Similarly,
they have the power to rescind a reinstated removal order or expedited
removal order.
Under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5, an individual may ask CBP to reopen
and rescind a removal order. The Ninth Circuit has explained that the
agency must consider all favorable and unfavorable factors relevant to
the exercise of its discretion in considering whether to reinstate a
removal order, and that failure to do so would constitute an abuse of
discretion. 152 Indeed, some attorneys have managed to get a
reinstatement of removal order reversed or an expedited removal order
rescinded, but with limited success, and primarily under previous

150.
See Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportations, supra note 32, at 22
(“‘Prosecutorial discretion’ refers to a decision by the immigration agency about
whether, and to what extent, DHS should enforce immigration laws against a
person or group.”).
151.
Villa-Anguiano v. Holder, 727 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that
DHS may “decide to forgo reinstatement of a prior order of removal in favor of
initiating new removal proceedings, with the accompanying procedural rights to
counsel and a hearing in immigration court”); see also Alcala v. Holder, 563 F.3d
1009, 1013–14 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that the government is not required by law
to issue a reinstatement of removal order).
152.
See Villa-Anguiano, 727 F.3d at 878 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5); 8
C.F.R. § 241.8(a)–(b)).
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administrations. 153 In a 2014 report, the ACLU interviewed sixty-nine
advocates and concluded that “it is incredibly rare to get an order
rescinded by border officials.” 154 According to a panel discussion at the
Federal Bar Association conference in May 2018, a CBP attorney in
San Francisco shared that the Port directors determine whether or not
to grant such motions, but they are entirely discretionary. 155

B. Asking the Office of Chief Counsel to Exercise Prosecutorial
Discretion to Issue an NTA and Not to Accept CBP’s
Reinstatement of the Prior Expedited Removal Order
When CBP will not reopen and rescind the expedited removal
order, a second strategy is to ask the prosecuting official to decline to
153.
Koh, Removal in the Shadows, supra note 32, at 201–03, has had some
success with this. In following up with Professor Koh, she shared the compelling
motion filed on behalf of her client, which resulted in the reopening and rescission
of the expedited removal order, although this was in 2016 and prior to the Trump
Administration. See also Koh, Searching for Solutions, supra note 32, at 360 n.137
(noting reports of some success with motions to reopen and rescind expedited
removal orders). Trina Realmulto of the American Immigration Council shared
seven decisions issued by CBP granting a request to rescind a removal order, which
included three positive decisions from Los Angeles, CA from 2015 and 2016; one
positive decision from Nogales, AZ, in 2016, from Hidalgo, TX, in 2016, from Boston,
MA in 2015; and most recently from Laredo, TX, in November 2017. She also shared
one decision granting attorney Stacy Tolchin’s request to rescind a reinstatement
of removal order from Los Angeles, issued in 2015. All of these decisions and
motions are on file with the author.
154.
ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 109, at 18, 80.
155.
Telephone Interview with Trina Realmuto, Directing Attorney,
American Immigration Council (Aug. 15, 2018). Indeed, in Cecilia’s case, counsel
filed such a request with CBP’s Rio Grande Valley sector in January 2018, where
both of Cecilia’s prior expedited removal orders were issued, and received no
response before Cecilia’s April 2018 trial. Cecilia was granted withholding of
removal. Later, in August 2018, CBP responded and denied the request to reopen
and rescind the removal orders, stating that there is “no prescribed mechanism for
U.S. Border Patrol to reopen, reconsider, or vacate an expedited removal order.”
This request should have been styled instead as a request to reopen and rescind the
reinstatement of the removal orders on June 9, 2014 and October 23, 2015.
Regardless, unfortunately this would not make a difference for Cecilia. Her
withholding grant was largely based on the 2014 Matter of A-R-C-G- decision, which
was overruled by former Attorney General Sessions’ decision in Matter of A-B- in
June 2018. Even if Cecilia’s removal orders could vanish and she could file a motion
to reopen and file for asylum today in immigration court, her chances of success are
somewhat diminished. Although asylum cases for domestic violence survivors have
been granted in the wake of Matter of A-B- and Cecilia may prevail on the merits,
this is very dependent on the individual judge and DHS trial attorney involved in
the case.
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place the asylum seeker into withholding-only proceedings based on
CBP’s reinstatement of the prior order. The prosecuting official within
ICE can instead issue a Notice to Appear, placing the individual into
full removal proceedings and allowing an asylum seeker to pursue
asylum.
The decision to place an individual into withholding-only
proceedings, as opposed to regular removal proceedings, lies in the
hands of a charging officer or with an attorney from the ICE Office of
Chief Counsel. 156 “‘Prosecutorial discretion’ refers to a decision by the
immigration agency about whether, and to what extent, DHS should
enforce immigration laws against a person or group.” 157 At least in the
past, ICE trial attorneys have had broad prosecutorial discretion and,
as one scholar has cogently argued, “certain concrete responsibilities—
expressed in statutory provisions, case law, and agency guidance—to
seek legitimate objectives, take steps to ensure procedural justice, and
exercise equitable discretion in appropriate cases.” 158 In this case,
specifically, under Section 1231(a)(5) of the INA, ICE agents have the
power to reinstate a prior removal order but “may exercise their
discretion not to pursue streamlined reinstatement procedures.” 159
In Cecilia’s case, counsel submitted such a request to the Office
of Chief Counsel a few months before Cecilia’s withholding-only
hearing. In phone conversations with the original ICE trial attorney
156.
Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 520, 523 (B.I.A. 2011) (“[W]e
find that the statutory scheme itself supports our reading that the DHS has
discretion to put aliens in section 240 removal proceedings even though they may
also be subject to expedited removal under section 235(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Act.”); see
also ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 109, at 14 (“[A]n immigration enforcement
officer does have the option to refer a non-citizen to a full hearing in an immigration
court even where the non-citizen is eligible for a summary removal procedure.”);
Wadhia, Speed Deportations, supra note 32, at 22 (citing memoranda issued in 2011
by then–ICE Director, John Morton).
157.
See Wadhia, Speed Deportations, supra note 32, at 22.
158.
See Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal
Proceedings, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2014) [hereinafter Cade, The Challenge of Seeing
Justice Done].
159.
See Villa-Anguiano v. Holder, 727 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n
ICE officer may decide to forgo reinstatement of a prior order of removal in favor of
initiating new removal proceedings . . . .”). Under 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(b) (2018), where
it is “impracticable” for the original officer issuing the NTA to cancel the notice,
another officer may do so. Although the BIA has said that trial attorneys do not
have the authority to withdraw NTAs that have been filed with the court, the trial
attorneys can still file a motion for administrative closure or termination of
proceedings, and re-issue a new NTA, or issue a new NTA with the judge’s
permission.
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assigned to the case, that attorney indicated that it was office policy to
reinstate all prior removal orders unless there was a clear expression
of fear in the record by Cecilia in her interactions with CBP. This is the
precise issue—Cecilia expressed her fear and the CBP officers with
whom she interacted on two occasions ignored that fear, failed to record
it, and deported her.
On the day of her trial, a new trial attorney was assigned to
Cecilia’s case. He echoed the same policy as his colleague and
emphasized a need for “something” in the record indicating a fear
expressed at an earlier stage. Ultimately, within the same
conversation where he declined to exercise discretion not to reinstate
the prior removal orders, he exercised his discretion positively and
spontaneously to stipulate to a grant of withholding of removal for
Cecilia and asylum for her daughter. This stipulation came solely
based on the record before the court, without even hearing testimony
from Cecilia, highlighting the strength of the case.
The absurdity and injustice of this decision is paramount. The
trial attorney in 2018 recognized how strong Cecilia’s case was, so
much so that he believed her solely based on the record evidence,
without even needing to hear her speak a word or recount her
traumatic experiences herself. Regardless, based on her alleged failure
to articulate that fear when apprehended by border officials in 2014,
he made the decision to preclude her from obtaining durable relief and
being reunited with her son.
Ironically, Cecilia’s daughter was granted asylum protection,
despite having a weaker case than her mother and having endured far
less past persecution at the hands of her father, while her mother, the
direct victim of the persecution, was only granted withholding
protection. It was Cecilia’s word against official records from CBP, and
in spite of the compelling record evidence, in the absence of concrete,
contemporaneous evidence in Cecilia’s favor, the ICE attorney chose to
side with his immigration agency colleagues.

C. Appellate Dreams Dashed: Limited Judicial Review of
Expedited Removal Orders
With such limited ability to eliminate the underlying removal
order, as discussed above, advocates have tried over the years to seek
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appellate review of the decision not to allow individuals subject to
reinstatement of removal to seek asylum. 160
Strict limits on judicial review of the expedited removal system
make this very difficult. 161 Habeas review, by which an individual can
challenge government detention before a judge, is similarly limited and
only available in three narrow situations, where there is a need to
determine (1) whether the individual is an “alien,” (2) whether a
removal order was issued, and (3) whether the individual can
demonstrate that he or she is a lawful permanent resident, a refugee,
or an asylee. 162 Challenges to the expedited removal system as a whole
must be brought within sixty days of a written policy change. 163 All of
this means that an asylum seeker wrongfully issued an expedited
removal order has little recourse through our federal appellate court

160.
The litigation is discussed below. In one law review article, Hillary
Gaston Walsh argues that the reinstatement of prior orders of removal should not
bar asylum seekers from accessing asylum protection. See Hillary Gaston Walsh,
Forever Barred: Reinstated Removal Orders and the Right to Seek Asylum, 66 CATH.
U. L. REV. 613, 666 (2017).
161.
See INA § 242(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A) (2012). For more on the
strict limits to challenging expedited removal orders, see ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE,
supra note 109, at 3 (“These summary procedures invite, and guarantee, error. And
yet erroneous—even illegal—summary removal orders are difficult to challenge
because of the speed of the process, the limited ‘evidence’ required, and the absence
of a complete record of the proceeding. These procedures might need more review,
as they lack many courtroom safeguards; instead, most summary procedures are
subject to strict jurisdictional limits that severely limit the possibility of any judicial
review.”).
162.
These limitations on habeas review for expedited removal orders are
called into question by the Constitution’s Suspension Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 2. The Third Circuit addressed this in Castro v. DHS, a case brought by 28
women and their children asylum seekers from Central America who challenged
the expedited removal orders issued against them. 835 F.3d 422, 445 (3d Cir. 2016).
The court found that the asylum seekers did not benefit from the Suspension Clause
given their limited contacts and ties in the United States and apprehension within
hours of arrival in the United States. But see Osorio-Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
893 F.3d 153, 167 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that the Suspension Clause did apply to
four children granted Special Immigrant Juvenile status while held in immigration
detention). As this article went to print, the Ninth Circuit created a circuit split on
this issue, finding that asylum seekers are entitled to federal court review of
expedited removal orders. See Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917
F.3d 1097, 1100, 1116–1119 (9th Cir. 2019).
163.
See INA § 242(e)(3); see also Oluwadamilola E. Obaro, Expedited
Removal and Statutory Time Limits on Judicial Review of Agency Rules, 92 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 2132, 2132 (2017) (arguing that “courts should not read the expedited
removal time-limit to bar constitutional challenges to expedited removal that could
not have been raised within the prescribed time limit”).
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system. Perversely, “[t]hose with the least amount of process at the
front end also receive virtually no avenue to seek accountability by way
of federal court review at the back end.” 164
Advocates have brought challenges to the reinstatement of a
prior removal order as a bar to asylum in almost every jurisdiction
throughout the United States. Specifically, advocates have argued that
conflicting sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act should
mean that, under the plain language of the statute, an individual with
a reinstated removal order is asylum-eligible. 165 Unfortunately, these
challenges have been unsuccessful. Courts have found, in various
ways, that those subject to reinstatement of removal after re-entering
without inspection may not seek asylum. 166 In April 2018, the Board of
Immigration Appeals weighed in definitively on this issue, finding that

164.
See Koh, Searching for Solutions, supra note 32, at 372. The ACLU
notes that “[t]he reinstatement process is particularly harsh when applied to people
who previously were deported in summary proceedings where they did not have a
hearing before an immigration judge, and thus, had no opportunity to present
evidence, receive legal assistance, or have a meaningful opportunity to appeal the
prior removal order.” ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 109, at 21.
165.
Compare INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2012) (“Any alien
who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United
States . . . irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum . . . .”) with id.
§ 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012) (providing that the previous removal order
is “reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed,
the alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this chapter, and the
alien shall be removed under the prior order at any time . . . .”) (emphasis added).
166.
See, e.g., Garcia v. Sessions, 856 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. denied,
138 S.Ct. 2652 (2018) (according Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of
the statute and finding those subject to reinstatement ineligible for asylum, but the
dissent questions underlying validity of the initial removal proceedings); HerreraMolina v. Holder, 597 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2010) (examining the plain language
of § 1231(a)(5) and DHS regulations and holding that “relief other than withholding
of removal . . . is not available to this petitioner”); Cazun v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 856
F.3d 249, 251 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 2648 (2018); Calla-Mejia v.
Sessions, 866 F.3d 573, 587 (4th Cir. 2017); Lara-Aguilar v. Sessions, 889 F.3d 134,
140–43 (4th Cir. 2018); Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 490–91 (5th Cir.
2015) (considering § 1158’s “discretionary nature” and concluding that “[a]ffording
asylum relief to aliens whose removal orders are reinstated would be inconsistent
with [§ 1231(a)(5)]”); Ochoa-Carillo v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 842, 847 (8th Cir. 2006);
Perez-Guzman v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016); Moralez-Izquierdo v.
Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 506 (9th Cir. 2007); Ayala v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 1012, 1016
(9th Cir. 2017); Jimenez-Morales v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 821 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th
Cir. 2016) (cert. denied) (examining § 1231(a)(5) and § 1158 and concluding that
“[a]s asylum is a form of relief from removal” contained in Chapter 12 of Title 8 of
the U.S. Code, an individual subject to a reinstated removal order “is not eligible
for and cannot seek asylum”).
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“[a]n applicant in withholding of removal only proceedings who is
subject to a reinstated order of removal . . . is ineligible for asylum.” 167
In rejecting advocates’ plain language
statute itself makes clear that any person is
asylum—courts seem to assume that asylum
challenge the initial expedited removal order
unrealistic expectation for several reasons.

argument—that the
eligible to apply for
seekers are able to
itself. 168 This is an

First, beyond review by an immigration judge, the federal
appellate courts lack jurisdiction to review expedited removal
orders. 169
Second, even if there were a mechanism by which an asylum
seeker could challenge the expedited removal order, many asylum
seekers subjected to expedited removal do not even understand that
they have acquired a removal order. 170 Further, most asylum seekers
are unaware of the process to actually seek asylum. Complicating
matters, all of the documents prepared are in English, and although
Spanish speakers are often spoken to in some version of their native
language, language access for speakers of rare or indigenous languages
is poor.
Third, the deadline to petition for reopening such an order is
within thirty days of its issuance. 171 It would likely take days or weeks
for an asylum seeker to file such a court motion, while deportation after
an expedited removal order would be swift.
Fourth, most asylum seekers are fleeing for their lives and thus
their immediate safety is the priority. This is especially so for those
who have been returned to the place from which they fled persecution.

167.
Matter of L-M-P-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 265, 265 (B.I.A. 2018).
168.
See, e.g., Mejia, 866 F.3d at 590 (“Rather, we think it more than feasible
that an individual removed to her home country could illegally re-enter the United
States, have the original removal order reinstated by DHS, and petition for
review—all within a month’s time.”).
169.
INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (providing for
expedited removal “without further hearing or review” of the officer’s
determination); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(f) (2018).
170.
Immigration clinicians train students and new immigration attorneys
to ask whether an individual has ever had any contact with border officials or had
their photograph taken or been fingerprinted, to try to assess whether a prior
removal order exists. Sometimes, the only way to definitively know is to file a
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.
171.
INA § 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (2012).
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Finally, asylum seekers often lack the resources to access
counsel, along with the language skills or even literacy to navigate the
U.S. court system. 172
Professor Koh asserts that “the courts might exercise
jurisdiction over expedited removal orders issued in error—for
instance, because an officer failed to adequately inquire or assess
fear.” 173 However, most courts have rejected this. 174 Koh has also
suggested a different argument, using the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) to challenge placing individuals in reinstatement
proceedings following a prior expedited removal order. 175 Specifically,
under the APA, agencies must avoid “arbitrary and capricious” action
and demonstrate reasoned decision-making. 176 Using the reasoning of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Judulang v. Holder, Koh argues that
review of an immigration agency’s exercise of discretion should
consider various factors including worthiness, merit, an individual’s
“attributes and circumstance,” and whether the individual is
“deserving.” 177
172.
These concerns about practical barriers facing asylum seekers have
been identified in the author’s experience representing asylum seekers as Professor
and Co-Director of the Immigration and Human Rights Clinic at the University of
the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law, and in her previous work
with the American Immigration Council, the Georgetown Center for Applied Legal
Studies, Tahirih Justice Center, and through law school clinical experiences.
173.
Koh, Searching for Solutions, supra note 32, at 374. See also Am.-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm, v. Ashcroft, 272 F. Supp. 2d 650, 663 (E.D. Mich. 2003)
(asserting habeas jurisdiction “to determine whether the expedited removal statute
was lawfully applied”); Dugdale v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 88 F. Supp. 3d 1,
2 (D.D.C. 2015) (asserting jurisdiction over the applicant’s claim that “his removal
order was procedurally defective”); Ramirez-Molina v. Ziglar, 436 F.3d 508, 515 (5th
Cir. 2006) (finding jurisdiction to review petitioner’s underlying removal order but
finding no gross miscarriage of justice in underlying proceedings because petitioner
failed to challenge his removability).
174.
Koh, Searching for Solutions, supra note 32, at 374; see also Villegas de
la Paz v. Holder, 614 F.3d 605, 610 (6th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the court has
“jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law raised in the context of
reinstatement proceedings,” but ultimately finding that it lacks “jurisdiction to
review the underlying deportation order”); Lorenzo v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1278,
1281 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that the court lacks “jurisdiction to review any
constitutional or statutory claims related to the underlying removal order”).
175.
See id. at 382 (explaining that arbitrary and capricious review requires
courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . [that is] arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”) (citing
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)).
176.
Id.
177.
Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 55–57 (2011). Others have also made
arguments that Judulang weighs in favor of an exercise of prosecutorial discretion
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This is a creative idea that merits exploration by advocates and
litigants. However, any daylight on this issue for asylum seekers will
take years to come by in the circuit courts. This Article instead
considers more immediate solutions to the problematic interplay of
expedited removal and reinstatement of removal as it pertains to those
seeking protection in the United States.

III. SOLUTIONS TO STOP DEPRIVING ASYLUM SEEKERS OF
MEANINGFUL PROTECTION
Pending legal challenges to CBP’s implementation of the
expedited removal system for asylum seekers do not specifically
address the problematic interplay between reinstatement of removal
and expedited removal. For example, a lawsuit pending in the
Southern District of California alleges that CBP and DHS are violating
domestic and international law, along with asylum seekers’ Fifth
Amendment due process rights. 178 This lawsuit specifically focuses on
the illegal turnbacks of individuals who express a fear of return at our
border. It does not address the issue of CBP officers failing to refer
asylum seekers for credible fear interviews and issuing expedited
removal orders that are later reinstated following a subsequent entry
without inspection.
In June 2018, a lawsuit was filed under the Federal Torts
Claims Act against CBP on behalf of an individual fleeing Mexico and
seeking asylum based on his sexual orientation. 179 In addition to
numerous other failings in the interview process, CBP failed to ask
about the asylum seeker’s fear of persecution and deported him to
Mexico. 180 When the asylum seeker entered the United States again
and expressed his fear of return, his fear was ignored, his removal
order was reinstated, and he was again deported to Mexico. 181

taking into account the equities of an individual situation. See Jason A. Cade,
Judging Immigration Equity: Deportation and Proportionality in the Supreme
Court, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1029, 1071–75 (2017); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The
Immigration Prosecutor and the Judge: Examining the Role of the Judiciary in
Prosecutorial Discretion Decisions, 16 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 39, 53 (2013).
178.
See Al Otro Lado Complaint, supra note 6, at 2.
179.
Complaint, Crespo Cagnant v. United States, No. 1:18-cv-22267-FAM
(S.D. Fla. June 7, 2018), https://cbpabusestest2.files.wordpress.com/2018/08/crespo
_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YHK-YWS6].
180.
Id. at 10–12.
181.
Id. at 12–15.
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While these lawsuits are in the works, they may not ultimately
be successful and may not have remedies that address the depth of the
problem. Consequently, we must consider more systemic reforms.
Ideally, given all of the challenges with expedited removal highlighted
in this Article, the system should be scrapped and we would return to
full due process and judicial review for asylum seekers, eliminating
reinstatement of removal altogether. In the current political climate,
however, this seems unrealistic.
Thus, this Part considers a number of potential reforms—
including congressional action to increase oversight and transparency
of the expedited removal system, which in some ways may gain some
traction in the current political environment. Next, this Part considers
encouraging the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which, although
certainly appropriate, seems unlikely in the current climate. Other
solutions include increasing access to counsel, which seems both
realistic, considering increased attention and funding for immigration
advocacy work, and simultaneously challenging given the
government’s extreme resistance to allowing attorneys to be more
involved in the process. Finally, this Part considers reforms within the
Customs and Border Protection agency itself. Broadly, one reform
would be enhanced training for CBP officers, which may only go so far
in the current environment of extreme animus and anti–asylum seeker
rhetoric from the highest levels of our government.
A final, and perhaps the most practical and realistic, proposal
will be discussed in Part IV, which is to follow the lead of law
enforcement agencies throughout the country in their attempts to
counter rampant abuse and a lack of public trust and transparency
through the introduction of body-worn cameras. This Article proposes
that all CBP officers conducting screening interviews wear these
devices to create a permanent and accessible record of asylum seekers
expressing their fear and to definitively understand whether required
laws and protocols are being followed.

A. Congressional Action
In the current political climate, statutory overhaul favorable to
asylum seekers seems unrealistic. 182 There are, however, actions
Congress could take to increase oversight and accountability of CBP
given the severity of the failures of the expedited removal system. CBP
itself recognizes the stakes of the system and explains them within the
182.

See Koh, Searching for Solutions, supra note 32, at 394.
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Field Officer’s Manual: “The expedited removal proceedings give
officers a great deal of authority over aliens and will remain subject to
serious scrutiny by the public, advocacy groups, and Congress.” 183
The political will may exist to create such transparency in light
of the extreme public engagement after recent actions by the
Departments of Homeland Security and Justice to prosecute
individuals at the border and separate children from their parents. 184
Indeed, public outrage is at a peak and a campaign to #AbolishICE has
gained some traction. 185 Congress could mandate this oversight
through the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom or
another body. 186 Calls for such oversight are not new and the
importance of external scrutiny cannot be overstated. 187 Scholars
Pistone and Hoeffner have also suggested testers—actors who would
go through the expedited removal process to assess whether CBP
officers are following the rules. 188
Comprehensive immigration reform is, of course, always up for
debate, but ultimately this Article concludes that such reform is

183.
INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 63, § 17.15(b)(1).
184.
See, e.g., Phil McCausland, Patricia Guadalupe & Kalhan Rosenblatt,
Thousands Across U.S. Join ‘Keep Families Together’ March to Protest Family
Separation, NBC NEWS (June 30, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/thousands-across-u-s-join-keep-families-together-march-protest-n888006
[https://perma.cc/35WQ-7R4A] (reporting on the six hundred marches that occurred
throughout the country demanding the Trump administration reunite separated
families).
185.
See, e.g., Ron Nixon & Linda Qui, What is ICE and Why Do Critics Want
to Abolish It?, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
07/03/us/politics/fact-check-ice-immigration-abolish.html (on file with Columbia
Human Rights Law Review) (explaining the call to abolish ICE); Eliza Relman, The
First Signs Are Emerging That the Progressive Campaign to Abolish ICE Is
Working, BUS. INSIDER (July 24, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/abolishice-campaign-democrats-progress-updates-2018-7 [https://perma.cc/YG6G-JH5R]
(“72% of Democrats now support eliminating the agency, according to new
polling.”).
186.
See, e.g., BORDER ENFORCEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY, OVERSIGHT, AND
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT ACT OF 2017, H.R. 3020, 115TH CONG. (2017) (proposing
legislation establishing a DHS border oversight commission and expanding the
USCIS Ombudsman’s Office created by the Homeland Security Act in 2002 to make
it the Ombudsman for Border and Immigration Related Concerns).
187.
See Pistone & Hoeffner, Rules are Made to Be Broken, supra note 66, at
201–02 (arguing that “Congress should authorize a regular schedule of studies with
the idea of continuing them until substantial improvement is shown” and the
agency should be required to respond to those studies).
188.
Id. at 202–03.
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unlikely and sets up a more focused solution to address this particular
problem, below in Part IV.

B. Prosecutorial Discretion in Expedited Removal and
Reinstatement of Removal
Another solution to the problematic interplay between
expedited removal and reinstatement of removal may be to expand the
use of prosecutorial discretion. Scholars have long called for the
expansion of prosecutorial discretion in the “speed deportation”
realm 189 and in immigration more broadly. 190 Similarly, Human Rights
Watch’s 2014 report called for CBP to “apply a presumption of fear of
return for migrants in expedited removal” who are from particular
countries. 191
DHS has discretion regarding whether and when to subject an
individual to expedited removal or reinstatement of removal. 192 The
BIA recognizes that DHS can place individuals who have expedited
removal orders into regular removal proceedings, where they could
apply for asylum relief. 193 In issuing a Notice to Appear, ICE should
“consider humanitarian factors and the possibility for other relief when
deciding to place a person who legally qualifies for speed deportation
in removal proceedings instead.” 194
As the BIA has recognized, DHS trial attorneys have:

189.
Id. at 22–25.
190.
See Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done, supra note 158, at 13
(“This sweeping, categorical, and unforgiving approach thus elevates the role of
enforcement discretion, which must compensate for the statute’s lack of nuance.”);
Frost, Learning from Our Mistakes, supra note 40, at 786 (suggesting that to guard
against mistakes in immigration enforcement, immigration officers should “err on
the side of interpreting the law expansively,” and arguing in favor of a “rule of
lenity” to minimize errors leading to the “wrongful exclusion and deportation of
those entitled to remain in the United States”).
191.
HRW, YOU DON'T HAVE RIGHTS HERE, supra note 109, at 41.
192.
See Wadhia, Speed Deportations, supra note 32, at 22 (citing a pair of
memos issued by then–ICE Director John Morton in 2011).
193.
Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 520, 520 (B.I.A. 2011); see
also Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 726 (B.I.A. 1997) (discussing the
immigration judge and trial attorney’s responsibilities to ensure that refugee
protection is provided where warranted, including introducing evidence favorable
to the respondent).
194.
See Wadhia, Speed Deportations, supra note 32, at 24 (citing the Morton
Memo).
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[A]n obligation to uphold international refugee law,
including the United States’ obligation to extend refuge
where such refuge is warranted. That is, immigration
enforcement obligations do not consist only of initiating
and conducting prompt proceedings that lead to
removals at any cost. Rather, as has been said, the
government wins when justice is done. 195
In Cecilia’s case, and in line with the obligations of DHS trial
attorneys, prosecutorial discretion should have been exercised.
Cecilia’s case presented a clear example of where the equities and the
compelling humanitarian case for family reunification, along with
Cecilia’s eligibility for asylum, merited discretion. 196 Indeed, as made
clear from the record in the case, Cecilia’s partner, the father of her
child, had abused his young son, stuck in Honduras, from the age of
three; had served jail time for slashing Cecilia’s sister’s shoulder with
a machete; had set alight two inmates while incarcerated, killing one
of them; and yet had been released from custody by the time of Cecilia’s
asylum hearing. The equities clearly weighed in favor of reunifying this
traumatized young boy with his mother.
Unfortunately, in the current era of hyper-aggressive
immigration enforcement and directives from on high not to exercise
prosecutorial discretion, calls for the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion seem perhaps unrealistic. 197 In order to more effectively
195.
See S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 727; see also Erin B. Corcoran, Seek
Justice, Not Just Deportation: How to Improve Prosecutorial Discretion in
Immigration Law, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 119, 131 (2014) (arguing that ICE attorneys
have ethical duties to pursue justice and that prosecutorial discretion should be
formalized through an attorney’s manual clearly setting out ICE policies, practices,
and priorities for use of prosecutorial discretion).
196.
See Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done, supra note 158, at 25
(“The other objective [of prosecutorial discretion agency memoranda] is to ensure
that ICE attorneys take special account of situations in which noncitizens are
technically in violation of civil immigration laws but have strong humanitarian
factors militating in favor of discretion.”). This case is not unique. The author has
handled other cases where withholding grantees are permanently separated from
their children with no possibility of reunification because of an erroneously issued
expedited removal order. See also ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 109, at
21–22 (giving the example of an indigenous Guatemalan woman who received an
expedited removal order because her fear was ignored and now, even if she wins
her withholding case, she will not be reunited with her child).
197.
Indeed, much of the positive Obama-era guidance on prosecutorial
discretion has implicitly, if not explicitly, been overridden by the Trump executive
orders, the end of the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), etc. See Cade, The
Challenge of Seeing Justice Done, supra note 158, at 28–35 (discussing the Morton

2019]

Withholding Protection

55

persuade trial attorneys and CBP officers to exercise discretion to
rescind or amend an erroneously issued expedited removal order,
something more is needed to lift the expedited removal process out of
the shadows. This will be discussed in Part IV.

C. Increasing Access to Counsel
One solution to the problem posed here—wrongful
deportations of asylum seekers resulting in expedited removal orders
that forever stain their quest for meaningful protection—is improved
access to counsel. Specifically, within the context of initial screening at
the border, access to counsel does not exist. 198 Secondary inspection
with a CBP officer is usually a no-go zone for attorneys with zero access
and transparency. 199 However, the involvement of attorneys in other
pieces of the process, from avoiding an illegal turnback at the border
to navigating a credible fear interview and beyond, suggests that
involvement of counsel would be highly beneficial in safeguarding the
rights of asylum seekers navigating the expedited removal process.
In a 2014 report, the ACLU recommended access to counsel for
all individuals facing removal through a summary procedure. 200
Stephen Manning and Kari Hong explore this question and ask
whether adequate access to counsel would “mitigate against erroneous
removals without undermining the statute’s goal of speed.” 201 Their
resounding answer, drawing on voluminous data from the CARA Pro
Bono Project (now the Dilley Pro Bono Project), which operates in
Dilley, Texas at the largest family detention center in the country, is
Memos in detail). Indeed, even where the directives or, as Pistone and Hoeffner
term them, “diktats from above,” do mandate prosecutorial discretion, this has little
effect on officer behavior in reality. Pistone & Hoeffner, Rules Are Made to Be
Broken, supra note 66, at 197; see also Rabin, supra note 127, at 200 (2014) (using
political scientist James Wilson’s analytical framework to understand bureaucratic
behavior as applied to ICE—focused on culture, historical formation, and critical
tasks).
198.
8 CFR § 292.5(b) (2018).
199.
See generally LEGAL ACTION CTR., AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, BEHIND
CLOSED DOORS: AN OVERVIEW OF DHS RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO COUNSEL 7–9
(2012), https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=irc_
pubs [https://perma.cc/6M3J-3X99].
200.
ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 109, at 8; see also Drake & Gibson,
Vanishing Protection, supra note 6, at 92 (calling for increased attorney
involvement and advocacy at earlier stages in the asylum process, including
“ensuring that those traveling to the U.S. border have access to the asylum
adjudication system”).
201.
Manning & Hong, Access to Counsel, supra note 32, at 678.
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yes, access to counsel fundamentally changes the asymmetrical power
dynamic surrounding rapid removals. 202 They do not examine,
however, the question of intervention of counsel at the border—in the
initial screening interaction with the CBP officer who makes a
determination of removability and supposedly administers the
statutorily required screening for asylum seekers. 203
Lawyers can indeed make a tremendous difference, even in this
early stage of the asylum-seeking process. Human Rights First’s 2017
report details numerous instances where advocacy by an attorney
prevented CBP’s wrongful deportation of an asylum seeker. 204 Around
the Spring 2018 refugee caravan, for example, Nicole Ramos, a lawyer
with Al Otro Lado, a non-profit organization which operates on the
California-Mexico border:
Would tell officers that every single person in the crowd
was afraid of persecution. Every asylum-seeker would
carry a Notice of Representation listing Ramos or
another volunteer lawyer as his attorney of record.
This would allow Al Otro Lado to visit them in
detention, document their treatment by Customs and

202.
Id. at 703–04; see also Ingrid Eagly, Steven Shafer, & Jana Whalley,
Detaining Families: A Study of Asylum Adjudication in Family Detention, 106 CAL.
L. REV. 785, 845–47 (2018) (discussing challenges for access to counsel in family
detention centers, but also noting the enormous difference legal representation
makes in the credible and reasonable fear process).
203.
Manning and Hong outline three distinct moments in which
adjudications take place within expedited removal—the first being the
“adjudication of removability and the entry of an expedited removal order.”
Manning & Hong, Access to Counsel, supra note 32, at 682.
204.
HRF, CROSSING THE LINE, supra note 6, at 7, 13. Examples include an
attorney who successfully requested that CBP process a Honduran family with
bullet wounds as asylum seekers after they had been turned away once by CBP; a
Turkish opposition group member who was successfully processed as an asylum
seeker only after attorney intervention; and a Mexican family who was turned away
twice by CBP before lawyers intervened and CBP processed them on their third
attempt, after which an immigration judge granted asylum. Id. The report also
details attorneys accompanying asylum seekers to border crossings and assisting
in the preparation of asylum applications and the presentation of evidence to
support the claim at the border; a Mexican journalist who accessed processing as
an asylum seeker only with attorney intervention; and a Mexican family stuck on
a bridge in Hidalgo until an attorney intervened at the port of entry. Id. See also
ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 109, at 40 (recounting an instance where a
Honduran asylum seeker eventually secured a credible fear interview due to
attorney intervention).
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Al Otro Lado’s work in Tijuana is gaining attention 206 and,
thankfully, funding. 207
In the current political climate, however, it may be a fool’s
errand to suggest heightened access to counsel during the critical stage
of the CBP interview that determines whether a person will receive a
credible fear interview or will instead be deported through expedited
removal. Former Attorney General Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III
labeled those who assist asylum seekers “dirty immigration lawyers” 208
and former DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen has threatened to
prosecute those who “coach” asylum seekers on false claims. 209 For
now, while attorneys certainly can and should push within the existing
framework on behalf of asylum-seeking clients to access protection, it
seems very unlikely that there will be any improvements in access to
counsel within the expedited removal process.
At the same time, to the extent that the access to counsel crisis
results from a lack of pro bono or low-cost lawyers for asylum seekers
in expedited removal proceedings, the current political climate and
outrage over family separation has created an, at least temporarily,
deep pool of funding to support this work. For example, a Texas-based
organization working with detained families and individuals raised
more than twenty million dollars in just a few days. 210 Other
205.
Daniel Duane, City of Exiles: Every Month, Thousands of Deportees from
the United States and Hundreds of Asylum-Seekers from around the World Arrive
in Tijuana. Many Never Leave, CAL. SUNDAY MAG. (May 30, 2018), https://
story.californiasunday.com/tijuana-city-of-exiles [https://perma.cc/2RDN-6D95].
206.
Id.
207.
See also Drake & Gibson, Vanishing Protection, supra note 6, at 121–22
(calling on advocates to think beyond the U.S. border and engage asylum seekers
in transit through Mexico).
208.
Jefferson Sessions, Attorney Gen., Remarks to the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorneygeneral-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-executive-office-immigration-review
[https://perma.cc/PLN9-D6U3].
209.
Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Sec’y Nielsen, Statement on the
Arrival of the Central American “Caravan” (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/
news/2018/04/25/secretary-nielsen-statement-arrival-central-american-caravan
[https://perma.cc/DBW9-Y9ED].
210.
Annie Correal, Women Ask ‘What if it Were Me?’ And Rush to Aid
Separated Families, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/
20/nyregion/crowdfunding-immigrant-children-separated.html (on file with
Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (mentioning the $20 million that RAICES
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organizations on the frontlines of this work, including Southern
Poverty Law Center, Northwest Immigrants’ Rights Project,
Innovation Law Lab, Florence Project, and Al Otro Lado, have all been
able to create new, if temporary, positions to increase access to counsel
for detained immigrants in light of the current influx of funding. States
have also stepped into the fray in the last few years to provide access
to counsel for immigrants where the federal government has failed. 211
Thus, despite the absence of formal access to attorneys for secondary
screening, as well as a lack of commitment from the federal
government to provide or enhance access to counsel for asylum seekers
in expedited removal, there is some hope for this solution.

D. Enhanced Training for CBP Officers
As mentioned above in Part I.A, currently the training that
CBP officers receive regarding the screening of asylum seekers at the
border lacks transparency. The Officer’s Reference Tool, which
replaced the Inspector’s Field Manual sometime around 2013, is not
publicly available. Nonetheless, “if change is going to occur in how DHS
processes deportation cases, it is most likely to come from within the
agency.” 212 Thus, reformed and enhanced training for CBP officers is

raised and also a more recent crowdfunding campaign in New York that quickly
raised $300,000).
211.
For example, since 2013, the New York Immigrant Family Unity
Project, a collaboration of several organizations, has worked to provide universal
representation for respondents appearing before the New York City Varick Street
Immigration Court without an attorney who meet income threshold criteria. See
NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., BLAZING A TRAIL: THE FIGHT FOR RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN DETENTION AND BEYOND 14 (2016), https://www.nilc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/Right-to-Counsel-Blazing-a-Trail-2016-03.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/D3MZ-23NS] [hereinafter NILC, BLAZING A TRAIL]. The Project has been
expanded to representation in a detention center in Buffalo, New York. Id. at 18;
see also JENNIFER STAVE ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., EVALUATION OF THE NEW
YORK IMMIGRANT FAMILY UNITY PROJECT: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF LEGAL
REPRESENTATION OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY UNITY (2017), https://www.vera.
org/publications/new-york-immigrant-family-unity-project- [https://perma.cc/9Q53
-7EHQ] [hereinafter VERA INST., NYIFUP] (evaluating the impact of the New York
Immigrant Family Unity Project on immigrants facing deportation). Also, in the
Northeast, in New Jersey the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)
launched the Friends Representation Initiative of New Jersey (FRINJ), a pilot
project offering representation, twice a week, to all detained immigrants who
appear before the Elizabeth, NJ Immigration Court. See NILC, BLAZING A TRAIL,
supra, at 211.
212.
See Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done, supra note 158, at 61
(proposing four modest solutions, including introducing discovery obligations, using
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one way to fundamentally shift organizational culture in favor of
actually following the law and regulations.
Legal scholarship has long highlighted the problems and
internal conflicts with the guidance that CBP did make available in
the past. 213 As Pistone and Hoeffner explain, CBP’s Inspector’s Field
Manual authorized officers to deport an individual without referring
for credible fear when the fear “clearly would not qualify that
individual for asylum.” 214 This guidance invites the officer to make a
complex legal determination and adjudication regarding asylum
eligibility that she is not authorized or trained to make. Although it is
unclear what the current Officer’s Reference Tool advises on this topic,
it is very likely that the internal training guidance for CBP needs
revision. 215 The advocate community agrees that training of CBP
officers is critically important. 216 Legislation to improve CBP training

vertical prosecution, increasing responsibility and authority for screening and
declining cases, and conducting prehearing conferences).
213.
Pistone & Hoeffner, Rules Are Made to Be Broken, supra note 66, at 188.
214.
Id. (citing Section 17.15(b) of the Immigration Court Practice Manual,
supra note 87).
215.
See Koh, Removal in the Shadows, supra note 32, at 233 (suggesting
that additional information on the training and oversight of individual front-line
immigration officials issuing expedited removal and reinstatement orders is
essential); Frost, Learning from Our Mistakes, supra note 40, at 788 (arguing for
improved training of CBP officers but basing this suggestion on the premise that
failures to recognize valid asylum claims stem from a lack of knowledge of asylum
law, rather than a CBP officer’s willful disregard of the law); see also Drake &
Gibson, Vanishing Protection, supra note 6, at 130 (advocating training for CBP
officers on the “importance of protecting potential asylum seekers and the breadth
of conduct that is sufficient for a referral”).
216.
HRW, YOU DON'T HAVE RIGHTS HERE, supra note 109, at 41
(recommending improved training for CBP officers, including “modification of
oversight mechanisms; accountability measures, including better quality assurance
supervision; and any and all other appropriate measures that initial interviews
conducted by CBP properly identify individuals who express fear of return so that
they are afforded ‘credible’ or ‘reasonable’ fear assessments”); HRF, CROSSING THE
LINE, supra note 6, at 3 (explaining that training needs to be enhanced for CBP
officers to “comply with U.S. domestic law and treaty commitments”); ACLU,
AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 109, at 8 (recommending that DHS “continuously
train and retrain immigration enforcement officers not to use coercion, threats, or
misinformation to convince individuals to give up the right to see a judge and to
accept deportation”); 2016 USCIRF REPORT, supra note 75, at 4 (emphasizing a
need to retrain all officers on their role in the expedited removal process).

60

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[50.3

was introduced in the House in 2017, but never advanced further in
the Congressional process. 217
In the current climate, however, training for CBP officers may
have only a negligible effect in the wake of former Attorney General
Sessions’ suggestion that “dirty immigration lawyers” feed magic
words to asylum seekers, a message that has only been amplified by
President Trump. 218 The administration is working very hard to
perpetuate the myth that asylum seekers are gaming the system and
falsely claiming a fear of return. As this narrative becomes more deeply
entrenched in the public and border enforcement psyche, it will become
more difficult to counter.
Prior to the extremely troubling decision issued by former
Attorney General Sessions on June 11, 2018, in which he overruled the
BIA’s precedential decision recognizing asylum claims for survivors of
domestic violence, 219 CBP officers were already misapplying asylum
law. The regulations CBP must follow require them simply to refer an
individual to USCIS for a fear interview if they express fear of return
or an intention to apply for protection. Nonetheless, in the twenty-two
years since expedited removal was implemented, border officials have
taken it upon themselves to deport asylum seekers. 220 The 2018 Matter
of A-B- decision will only further compound this problem as border
officials may be further emboldened by that decision to reject claims
related to domestic or gang violence as a threshold matter. 221
217.
See Border Enforcement Accountability, Oversight, and Community
Engagement Act of 2017, supra note 186, § 4 (outlining enhanced training for CBP
officers).
218.
Sessions, supra note 208; see also Donica Phifer, Donald Trump Calls
Asylum Claims a ‘Big Fat Con Job,’ Says Mexico Should Stop Migrant Caravans
Traveling to U.S. Border, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.newsweek.
com/donald-trump-calls-asylum-claims-big-fat-con-job-says-mexico-should-stop-13
79453 [https://perma.cc/47PG-8VBY] (citing Trump’s remarks at a Michigan rally
stating that asylum seekers were met by lawyers telling them to say that they are
afraid).
219.
Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
220.
See ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 109, at 37, 104–05.
221.
Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320 (“Generally, claims by aliens
pertaining to domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental
actors will not qualify for asylum . . . .”); id. at 320 n.1 (“Accordingly, few such claims
would satisfy the legal standard to determine whether an alien has a credible fear
of persecution.”); see also U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Guidance for
Processing Reasonable Fear, Credible Fear, Asylum, and Refugee Claims in
Accordance with Matter of A-B- (July 11, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/
default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-06-18-PM-602-0162-USCIS-Me
morandum-Matter-of-A-B.pdf [https://perma.cc/89R3-8D34] (providing direction for
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IV. LIFTING ASYLUM SEEKER SCREENING AT THE BORDER OUT OF
THE SHADOWS: BODY-WORN CAMERAS?
The proposals discussed in Part III all have clear shortcomings
and lack immediate political willpower. In contrast, this Part proposes
the use of Body-Worn Cameras (BWCs) as a way to more immediately
improve the situation on the border for asylum seekers and prevent the
erroneous issuance of expedited removal orders that put asylum
seekers at risk of being subjected to reinstatement of removal upon
attempted reentry.
As discussed above, remedies are few and far between for an
asylum seeker with an erroneously issued prior removal order.
Providing a record of the initial interaction with CBP would equip an
asylum seeker with evidence to support her assertion that she did in
fact express a fear of return, proving that it was erroneous for CBP to
issue an expedited removal order without referring the asylum seeker
to a CFI.
A byproduct of recording CBP secondary screening interactions
could be that officers would be more likely to follow their own
procedures and fewer erroneous removal orders would be issued. While
the implementation of Body-Worn Cameras (BWCs), or simply
recording technology more broadly, 222 has a number of advantages, this
section will also discuss the challenges to this solution.

USCIS officers regarding asylum and refugee eligibility in light of the decision in
Matter of A-B-). Notably, the ACLU and the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies
mounted a successful legal challenge to these new policies. See Complaint, Grace v.
Whitaker, No. 1:18-cv-01853 (D.D.C. 2018), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/
grace-v-sessions-complaint [https://perma.cc/QE7T-ZZ8V]. Implementation of
many of the key provisions of Matter of A-B- has been enjoined. See PRACTICE
ADVISORY: GRACE V. WHITAKER, supra note 49.
222.
I focus here on Body-Worn Cameras, but concede that the use of simple
audio recordings or of cameras inside an interviewing room might also mitigate
problems I have outlined. In reality, however, the screening interviews take place
in a variety of locations and so BWCs may be the most reliable way to ensure that
each and every screening interview is captured. See, e.g. 2016 USCIRF Report,
supra note 75, at 24–26 (detailing how interviews actually take place, including
through banks of computers and virtually conducted interviews with officers in
remote locations, sometimes in groups, rather than in an individual setting, and
quite rarely in private interview rooms). Another promising solution, brought to the
author’s attention as this article went to print, is the use of some kind of electronic
application, more commonly known as an “app,” similar to that proposed by
Professors Ferguson and Leo for use to administer Miranda warnings. See Andrew
Guthrie Ferguson & Richard A. Leo, The Miranda App: Metaphor and Machine, 97
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This is a not a new recommendation, 223 but it has not been
thoroughly explored in the legal scholarship and merits further
scrutiny in the wake of increased use of and attention towards BWCs
since 2014. Literature from the criminal context, where BWCs have
been on the rise since the watershed moment of Ferguson, 224 is
instructive in thinking through how to implement BWCs at the border.
BWCs are used by police officers nationwide. 225 Indeed, as the nation’s
largest law enforcement agency, CBP is an outlier in the absence of its
use of BWCs. 226
B.U. L. REV. 935 (2017). This app could be administered by CBP officials, recorded,
and used with any language and with visuals for illiterate individuals.
223.
See id. at 4, 7 (repeating USCIRF’s recommendation dating back as
early as 2005 of videotaping processing interviews as well as supervisory and
headquarters review of a sample of interviews for quality assurance); ACLU,
AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 109, at 105 (recommending that DHS video-record all
summary removal proceedings and keep a copy of the recording in the individual’s
“A-File.”). More broadly, the National Immigration Forum has recommended the
use of body cameras for all CBP agents in all interactions with the public. JAMES
R. LOPEZ ET AL., NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, BODY CAMERAS AND CBP:
PROMOTING SECURITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY AT OUR NATION’S
BORDERS 9 (2015), https://immigrationforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/
Body-Cameras-and-CBP-Report-11062015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5ZZQ-K6XM]
[hereinafter BODY CAMERAS AND CBP] (recommending the use of BWCs for all CBP
agents in all interactions with the public). U.S. lawmakers have also called on ICE
to use body-cameras. See Rafi Schwartz, Some Lawmakers Want Immigration
Enforcement Officers to Wear Body Cameras, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 13, 2017),
http://www.businessinsider.com/some-lawmakers-want-immigration-enforcementofficers-to-wear-body-cameras-2017-3?r=UK&IR=T [https://perma.cc/9J6A-EMTF]
(discussing the ICE Body Camera Act of 2017, H.R. 1497, introduced by Democratic
Brooklyn Congresswoman Yvette Clarke); see also Pistone & Hoeffner, Rules Are
Made to Be Broken, supra note 66, at 203–07 (supporting the use of videotaping of
secondary inspection interviews as a counterbalance to “the dominant enforcement
culture” and also advocating for the appointment of a senior asylum advocate
within DHS, along with requiring border officials to confirm in writing that they
read required information to applicants and forbidding telephonic review by
supervisory officers).
224.
Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy
Splits, 68 ALA. L. REV. 395, 408–09 (2016) [hereinafter Fan, Policy Splits]; Kami
Chavis Simmons, Body-Mounted Police Cameras: A Primer on Police Accountability
vs. Privacy, 58 HOW. L.J. 881, 882–83 (2015); Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn
Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1363, 1364–66 (2018).
225.
Fan, Policy Splits, supra note 224, at 409 (“According to a recent
survey . . . 95% of seventy law enforcement agencies surveyed have either
committed to putting body cameras on officers or have already done so.”); Laurent
Sacharoff & Sarah Lustbader, Who Should Own Police Body Camera Videos?, 95
WASH. U. L. REV. 269, 283 (2017).
226.
BODY CAMERAS AND CBP, supra note 223, at 20 (“If CBP does not
continue with implementation of body-worn cameras, it risks being the only large
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In thinking through the implementation of BWCs at the border
in the expedited removal screening process below, the potential
advantages and challenges are considered. Although BWCs have
arguably not been the panacea for police accountability that was hoped
for in the criminal justice context, 227 the goals in utilizing this
technology on the border differ and are perhaps less ambitious.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that the use of BWCs would be a
politically expedient, feasible solution to partially remedy the
injustices currently occurring at our border and to protect future
asylum seekers from being permanently barred from meaningful
protection by a border official’s failure to properly do her job.
BWCs should be worn by all CBP officers at all times in all
interactions with potential asylum seekers—which means in all
screening interviews at the border, throughout the entirety of the
interaction. Absent a recording of the interaction, a presumption
should operate in the asylum seeker’s favor by accepting her version of
events rather than the border official’s explanation.

A. Advantages of Body-Worn Cameras
The introduction of BWCs for officials at the border conducting
screening interviews poses a number of advantages, including:
increased transparency and efficiency; potential reduction in abuses,
including the use of physical force; and enhanced possibilities for
training and supervision.

1. Transparency
Body-Worn Cameras could increase transparency to take
expedited removal out of the darkness and put an end to the legal black
hole produced by the combination of expedited removal and

and most notable law enforcement agency that does not have such a program in
place.”).
227.
See, e.g., Eric Miller, Do Body Cameras Improve Police Conduct?,
PRAWFSBLOG (Oct. 18, 2018, 1:08 PM), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg
/2018/10/do-body-cameras-improve-police-conduct-.html [https://perma.cc/AF3KXSLA]. While the author lacks expertise in the criminal justice field, the literature
available seems primarily focused on the initial question regarding whether or not
BWCs should be used. Hopefully, we will begin to see deeper analysis of their
implementation and success in achieving the purported goals of their introduction
in the coming years.
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reinstatement. 228 Currently, “no clear mechanism for correction for
CBP officers that fail to even ask about fear—in violation of the
agency’s own regulations—exists.” 229 But the creation of such a
mechanism is possible. Requiring the use of BWCs by all CBP officers
conducting screening interviews would create a contemporaneous
record of the border interview, with the potential to ensure the
protection of many more asylum seekers.
The goals of BWCs in the criminal context are similar to the
concerns we are aiming to address in the immigration arena. Given the
intense distrust of police by communities, 230 BWCs aim to increase
transparency, as well as to guard against police violence and improve
professionalism. 231 Seth Stoughton discusses the Hawthorne Effect, or
“bystander effect,” as the “intuitive phenomenon that people behave
differently when they know they are being observed.” 232 This combined
with deterrence theory suggests that officers “may adapt their
behaviors because they know their actions are being scrutinized.” 233
From the officer’s perspective, BWCs may increase good behavior on
both sides and enhance officer safety. 234

228.
See Koh, Searching for Solutions, supra note 32, at 361 (“The layering
of one shadow removal upon another thus creates an even darker space in
immigration law than the operation of each process on its own.”).
229.
See id. at 392.
230.
Following Ferguson and the death of Michael Brown, President Obama
established the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing to examine ways to
improve community distrust of police. Establishment of the President’s Task Force
on 21st Century Policing, 79 Fed. Reg. 76,865 (Dec. 23, 2014); Stoughton, supra note
224, at 1381 (“Police executives, politicians, and policing scholars have expressed
their hope that body cams would increase public trust or explicitly asserted that
the technology can or is doing so.”).
231.
David A. Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn Video Devices (Head Cams)
As Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 357, 360 (2010) [hereinafter David A. Harris, Ensuring Fourth Amendment
Compliance].
232.
Stoughton, supra note 224, at 1386.
233.
Id. at 1389–90 (noting, however, that “cameras may deter misconduct,
but only if officers are sufficiently deterred from misusing (or not using) the
cameras themselves”).
234.
BODY CAMERAS AND CBP, supra note 223, at 12 (“[I]n fiscal year 2015
there were still 390 assaults on border patrol agents. Body-worn cameras could help
further reduce the number of assaults.”). But see Nell Greenfieldboyce, Body Cam
Study Shows No Effect on Police Use of Force or Citizen Complaints, NPR (Oct. 20,
2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/the two-way/2017/10/20/558832090/body-camstudy-shows-no-effect-on-police-use-of-force-or-citizen-complaints [https://perma.
cc/9NEX-HEYM] (discussing a study of the DC metropolitan police department’s
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Importantly, some studies have shown that BWCs may lead to
a significant reduction in use-of-force incidents. 235 Video recording all
CBP interactions would be beneficial because there are numerous
reports of physical abuse perpetrated by CBP officers. 236 Indeed,
between 2005 and 2015, CBP agents killed at least forty-five people,
and between 2005 and 2012, 2,170 incidents of misconduct by agents
were reported. 237 In the summer of 2018, for example, Claudia
Gonzalez, a CBP officer, shot a twenty-year-old indigenous woman
from Guatemala in the head. 238 With calls to #AbolishICE and public
criticism of immigration agencies at an all-time high, it is an
appropriate moment for CBP to take steps to improve transparency
and their public image. 239

2. Efficiency, Training, and Supervision
Another advantage may be increased efficiency for CBP
officers—BWCs would enable recording in real time, resulting in
increased accuracy regarding what was said in secondary screening

use of BWCs that had not made much of a difference, but recognizing that the
department was already in decent shape).
235.
Simmons, supra note 224, at 886 (citing one study showing a 60%
reduction in use of force incidents by police officers in 2012 in Rialto, California).
236.
See HRF, CROSSING THE LINE, supra note 6, at 6 (recounting an incident
where CBP officers knocked a Salvadoran transgender woman to the ground and
put their boots on her neck and groin area); ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE, supra note
109, at 36 (recounting an officer slapping an asylum seeker across the face with
forms when he refused to sign forms he did not understand).
237.
BODY CAMERAS AND CBP, supra note 223, at 10.
238.
Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Witness Recounts Fatal Border Patrol Shooting
of Young Guatemalan Woman in Texas, L.A. TIMES (May 26, 2018), http://www.
latimes.com/nation/la-na-border-shooting-20180526-story.html [https://perma.cc/
6UY4-D43W]; see also Gus Bova, The Border Patrol Serial Killer is Part of a Long,
Troubled History, TEX. OBSERVER (Sept. 19, 2018) https://www.texasobserver.
org/the-border-patrol-serial-killer-is-part-of-a-long-troubled-history/ [https://perma
.cc/6D7Q-BDT5] (describing the history of violent crimes, including murder,
committed by CBP agents); Manny Fernandez, They Were Stopped at the Border.
Their Nightmare Had Only Just Begun, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.ny
times.com/2018/11/12/us/rape-texas-border-immigrants-esteban-manzanares.html
(on file with the Columbia Human Rights Law Review) (describing incidents of
violence and sexual assault committed by CBP agents against women detained
while crossing the Rio Grande border).
239.
Legislation introduced in 2017 not only required CBP reporting on the
use of force and migrant deaths, but also required reporting to Congress on the use
of body-worn cameras. See Border Enforcement Accountability, Oversight, and
Community Engagement Act of 2017, supra note 186, § 6(d).
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interviews. 240 Another advantage is that supervision of officer conduct
may be more effective—body camera recordings allow a supervisor to
“see for himself what really happened.” 241 Currently, supervisors rely
on a conversation with the screening officer, often telephonic, to review
a decision to issue an expedited removal order. The existence of video
footage would allow a supervisor, who is required to review each
expedited removal order regardless, to view the actual interaction
leading to the expedited removal order himself.
In addition, BWCs can improve training by allowing
supervisors to use recordings for “assessment, training, and
disciplinary decisions.” 242 Assistance with training in the CBP context
is especially important. Up to thirty percent of border officials leave
the job within the first year and a half, but Congress requires that the
agency employ more than forty thousand agents and officers, creating
a “constant pressure to train and deploy new agents.” 243
Improvements in efficiency will not only be seen at the border
with CBP. Implementing BWCs would also lead to efficiencies for ICE
Office of Chief Counsel trial attorneys and for our immigration courts.
In the case of an alleged erroneously issued removal order, trial
attorneys assigned to the case, classified as withholding-only, could
readily review the videos of the secondary screening interview,
determine whether a fear was in fact articulated, and, if so, exercise
their discretion not to reinstate the prior removal order. This would
save court time and attorneys’ attempts to zealously advocate for their
clients on this issue—time that is precious, given our extremely
backlogged immigration court system.
The immigration system is desperately in need of efficiencies
and reform. Currently, 855,807 cases are pending in the immigration

240.
David A. Harris, Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance, supra note
231, at 361.
241.
Id. at 363; see also Stoughton, supra note 224, at 1417 (discussing the
parameters around when a supervisor should review an officer’s BWC recordings).
242.
David A. Harris, Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance, supra note
231, at 364–65; see also Simmons, supra note 224, at 887 (discussing how body
cameras can be a powerful training tool to correct structural problems within a
police department); Mary D. Fan, Democratizing Proof: Pooling Public and Police
Body-Camera Videos, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1639, 1654–55 (2018) [hereinafter “Fan,
Democratizing Policing”] (“The crisis in public confidence [following Ferguson] also
showed police chiefs the value of body cameras to supply evidence, rebuild trust,
reduce unfounded complaints, and potentially exonerate officers.”).
243.
BODY CAMERAS AND CBP, supra note 223, at 13 (citing H.R. 240, 114th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2015)).
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court backlog, 244 which will likely increase to over one million, given
policies recently instituted by former Attorney General Sessions. 245
The cases already in the backlog take several years to resolve, and all
expedited removal cases which receive a credible fear finding are
referred to court, joining that long queue. Any reforms to this system
to save on trial attorney and judge time should be welcome.

B. Concerns Regarding the Use of Body-Worn Cameras
Despite the advantages, there are serious concerns regarding
the use of BWCs at the border. These include: the protection of asylum
seekers’ privacy and, relatedly, the risks of stifling disclosure and
increasing asylum seekers’ fear; officer buy-in and the need to
renegotiate union contracts with CBP; challenges regarding how much
discretion to give officers with regards to when to use the device; the
necessary reliance on the prosecutorial discretion of immigration
agents, even with video evidence; and the financial cost of widespread
use of BWCs at the border.

1. Privacy
One of the most frequently voiced concerns in the criminal
context is whether the “possible benefit of these cameras could
outweigh the substantial privacy concerns.” 246 Indeed, in the criminal
context, these are serious concerns, as scholar Mary Fan suggests,
because through FOIA public disclosure requests intimate details and
private moments can end up in the public sphere. 247 Other scholars
244.
Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGRATION, supra note 105.
For an in-depth discussion of the backlog, see Harris, The One-Year Bar, supra note
16, at 1204–08.
245.
See, e.g., Jason Boyd, 8000 New Ways the Trump Administration is
Undermining Immigration Court Independence, HILL (Aug. 19, 2018), http://thehill.
com/opinion/immigration/402542-8000-new-ways-the-trump-administration-is-un
dermining-immigration-court [https://perma.cc/4TNR-4A2S] (discussing decisions
in 2018 issued by the Attorney General limiting an immigration judge’s ability to
manage her own docket, including administratively closing cases or granting
motions to continue); see also Immigration Court Backlog Surpasses One Million
Cases, TRAC IMMIGRATION, https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/536/ [https://
perma.cc/U4Zj-DMRX] (explaining how the then–Attorney General’s decision to
reopen 330,211 previously administratively closed cases brought the total backlog
to over one million cases).
246.
Simmons, supra note 224, at 884; see generally I. B. Capers, Race,
Policing, and Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1244–45 (2017) (arguing that giving
up some privacy is the price we must pay for reducing racialized policing).
247.
Fan, Policy Splits, supra note 224, at 397.
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suggest that the ownership and control of police body camera videos
should be shifted to a neutral police accountability agency. 248
Privacy concerns are of critical importance in the asylum
context. The stakes may potentially be higher than many situations in
the criminal context. If a persecutor, whether a governmental or nongovernmental actor, obtained access to information disclosed regarding
an asylum case, an asylum seeker’s family, friends, or associates may
be in danger. Further, an asylum seeker herself may face heightened
danger if information revealed during her border screening is shared
and she is returned to face her persecutors. Asylum seekers are often
understandably anxious to begin with about disclosing information
about their fear of persecution to anyone, let alone uniformed border
agents.
However, current procedures for screening asylum seekers at
the border do not prioritize privacy. USCIRF reported that between
mid-2013 and February 2015, CBP agents had “virtually processed”
more than one hundred thousand people in McAllen, Texas. 249 These
individuals were assigned to CBP officers in other stations in Texas or
California who completed the fear screening and I-867 form remotely
through Skype technology and a bank of computers, not even separated
by screens. 250 Private rooms for screening typically are not available in
CBP processing facilities, although in one location that has new private
rooms with acoustic padding for interviewing, a CBP supervising
officer acknowledged to USCIRF that people have been more
forthcoming about expressing their fear since the private rooms have
been in place. 251 The reality is that in most places, the fear screening
interviews lack privacy and so the addition of a video camera may not
be as much of an impediment to disclosure, or at least would not be the
only impediment.
Regarding the existence of a video or audio recording later
down the line for an asylum seeker in the adjudication process, privacy
protections already exist. The contents of asylum applications are not
publicly available and hearings can be closed to the public upon the
asylum seeker’s request. 252 In this context, the BWC video recording of
248.
Sacharoff & Lustbader, supra note 225, at 269, 270, 294–97.
249.
2016 USCIRF REPORT, supra note 75, at 24.
250.
Id. at 24.
251.
Id. at 26.
252.
See IMMIGRATION COURT MANUAL, supra note 87, § 4.9(a)(i) (allowing
asylum hearings to be closed to the public upon request and specifying that the
immigration judge will expressly ask the asylum seeker whether they want the
hearing to be closed); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 (2018) (preventing disclosure of
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a particular interaction between a border official and an asylum seeker
would simply become part of the asylum seeker’s Alien file, subject to
the usual privacy exemptions under FOIA disclosure. Although the
asylum seeker would not have “symmetrical” access to the video
recording, as would be ideal, 253 she would have the same access to it as
to the rest of her A-file through filing a FOIA request.

2. Stifling Disclosure and Increasing Fear in Asylum
Seekers
Another serious concern in the criminal context, potentially
heightened in the immigration context, is the fear that recording
interactions may make individuals reluctant to speak with law
enforcement officials. 254 Serious concerns exist with regards to privacy
and confidentiality when interacting with survivors of torture and
trauma. 255 Indeed, CBP’s own field office manual recognizes that
screening interviews should be conducted in “an area that affords
sufficient privacy, whenever feasible.” 256 Psychologist and trauma
expert Stuart Lustig has explained the difficulties that already exist
for trauma survivors seeking asylum when disclosing aspects of their
trauma at border screenings and in border interviews in the credible
fear context. 257
In the criminal context, Professor Fan has suggested that
concerns about reluctance of victims and domestic violence survivors
to speak with police officers can be met by police officers affirmatively
asking for permission to record. 258 In the immigration context,
however, would it make sense to give CBP officers the power to ask
information “contained in or pertaining to any asylum application, records
pertaining to any credible fear determination . . . without the written consent of the
applicant”).
253.
Sacharoff & Lustbader, supra note 225, at 308–14 (arguing for timely
access to video evidence for defendants in the criminal context).
254.
David A. Harris, Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance, supra note
231, at 363, 367; see also Simmons, supra note 224, at 889.
255.
In the author’s immigration clinic at UDC Law and in her previous
teaching at Georgetown Law, for example, student attorneys routinely ask asylumseeking clients if they are comfortable recording interview sessions. This is to
facilitate feedback and take some pressure off of student notetaking. Even in this
non-adversarial setting, a very small minority of clients express hesitation or
decline consent to record their interviews.
256.
INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 63, at 17.15(b).
257.
Declaration of Dr. Stuart L. Lustig, M.D., M.P.H., Expert on Trauma
and Asylum Seekers ¶¶ 3–8 (2017) (on file with author).
258.
Fan, Policy Splits, supra note 224, at 404, 437–43.
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asylum seekers whether or not they wanted recording? Given the long
and documented history of CBP abuses of the system in not accurately
recording fear statements, the concern is that the officer could just
claim an asylum seeker refused video recording to excuse the lack of a
video. 259
In this instance, despite the real concerns about silencing or
frightening an already traumatized asylum seeker, the addition of an
unobtrusive video camera, potentially affixed within the officer’s
badge, has the potential to do more good than harm. 260 If a body camera
can document the fear and perhaps prevent an asylum seeker being
unlawfully returned to potential death, this could be a life-saving
technological innovation in the asylum context and would be worth the
risk of a silencing effect—already a real concern given that CBP
officers are usually armed and uniformed. Given the pre-existing
systemic failures and the fact that silencing is a risk whether or not
CBP officers wear BWCs, the decrease in erroneously issued expedited
removal orders for asylum seekers who express fear most likely
outweighs any potential increase in asylum seekers who fail to express
fear.

3. Acceptance by Border Officials
One concern in the criminal context was officer “buy-in,” i.e.,
would police officers accept the BWCs and use them as instructed?
Over time, however, officer buy-in improves and police officers
recognize cameras may enhance officer safety 261 and guard against
illegitimate complaints. 262 As law enforcement agents, police officers
259.
See also Sacharoff & Lustbader, supra note 225, at 322 (“Studies have
shown that the more discretion police have to stop filming, or to never start filming,
the less that program deters misconduct.”) (citations omitted).
260.
But see Bryce Clayton Newell et al., Sensors, Cameras, and the New
‘Normal’ in Clandestine Migration: How Undocumented Migrants Experience
Surveillance at the U.S.-Mexico Border, 15 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 21, 21, 34–37
(2017) (disclosing the findings from a qualitative empirical study of a small group
of deported migrants in Mexico, only the minority of whom were asylum seekers,
expressing some hesitance regarding the use of BWCs by CBP officers).
261.
David A. Harris, Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance, supra note
231, at 360; see also Simmons, Police Accountability vs. Privacy, supra note 224, at
886 (explaining that body mounted cameras may serve a deterrent effect and
promote officer safety by holding officers accountable for their actions).
262.
Fan, Policy Splits, supra note 224, at 410; see also Bryce Clayton Newell
& Ruben Greidanus, Officer Discretion and the Choice to Record: Officer Attitudes
Towards Body-Worn Camera Activation, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1525, 1549–50 (2018)
[hereinafter Officer Discretion] (examining police officer attitudes towards BWCs
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have supported the use of BWCs. 263 There are concerns, however, that
CBP agency culture is different. 264 In the CBP context, officer buy-in
will be especially important given the strength of CBP’s union and
collective bargaining agreements that may consider BWCs a “change
in working conditions” necessitating negotiations between the Border
Protection union and the agency. 265 To ensure officer support for the
initiative and due to the sheer size of the agency, BWC use should be
piloted and phased in over time. 266

4. Discretion for Border Officials Operating Body-Worn
Cameras
Another challenge to address in implementing BWCs in the
immigration context is when precisely the devices would be used. In
the criminal context, rules vary on how much discretion to give officers
regarding when to use BWCs. 267 In understanding how best to
implement BWCs, CBP has a number of jurisdictions to draw on
throughout the United States and could also look to the U.K., which
has long implemented BWCs in its police force. 268
based on a four-year study in two municipal police departments in the Pacific
Northwest).
263.
David A. Harris, Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance, supra note
231, at 362–63.
264.
See, e.g., Francisco Cantu, Opinion, Cages are Cruel. The Desert is, Too,
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/30/opinion/
sunday/cages-are-cruel-the-desert-is-too.html
[https://perma.cc/9X5B-LNMU]
(recounting CBP officer’s observations of cruel behavior by fellow agents who “refer
to migrants as ‘criminals,’ ‘aliens,’ ‘illegals,’ ‘bodies’ or ‘toncs’ (possibly an acronym
for ‘temporarily out of native country’ or ‘territory of origin not known’—or a
reference to the sound of a Maglite hitting a migrant’s skull”)); John Washington,
Why We Need a WhistleBlower in U.S. Customs and Border Protection, NATION
(Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/why-we-need-a-whistleblowerin-us-customs-and-border-protection/ [https://perma.cc/2G8U-L9EG] (recounting
CBP culture as one lacking transparency and embracing impunity for abuses).
265.
BODY CAMERAS AND CBP, supra note 223, at 19.
266.
Id. (“Because CBP is the largest law enforcement agency in the country,
body-worn cameras may need to be phased in over a multiyear time frame; it would
be difficult to train more than 40,000 agents and officers all at once.”).
267.
See Fan, Policy Splits, supra note 224, at 412–19 (categorizing various
states’ approaches to disclosure into three groups: nondisclosure, filtered
disclosure, and camera turn-off and turn-on legislation).
268.
Id. at 419–22. It appears that the U.K. has also used Body-Worn
Cameras within Immigration Removal Centers. See NAT’L OFFENDER MGMT.
SERVS., PRISON SERVICE INSTRUCTIONS, SECURITY MANAGEMENT: BODY WORN
VIDEO CAMERAS (2017) https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/offenders/psipso/psi2017/PSI-2017-04-Body-Worn-Video-Cameras.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3L8-39AT].
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In the CBP context, BWCs should be used uniformly and
without exception. 269 Further, the absence of a recording 270 should
operate to create a presumption in favor of the intending immigrant.
For example, in a situation where CBP lacked a recording of a
screening interview with an immigrant like Cecilia, Cecilia’s own
account would be taken as the truth. She would be presumed to be an
asylum seeker and her erroneously-issued expedited removal order
should automatically be rescinded. While there may be valid reasons
why a recording does not exist—technology can malfunction, for
example 271—given the high stakes for asylum seekers as outlined in
Part I.C, guarding against abuse in the immigration context requires
that the presumption in the absence of a recording should be in the
asylum seeker’s favor. 272
It is entirely possible, however, that requiring video recordings
could also lead to abuse of that process. Human Rights First details
one instance where a Mexican asylum seeker was forced to recant her

269.
BODY CAMERAS AND CBP, supra note 223, at 17 (“CBP should have the
clearest and strictest policy possible—one that at least requires body-worn cameras
be on for all encounters with the public.”); see also Officer Discretion, supra note
262, at 1528 (“Research suggests that strict (mandatory) activation policies may
increase activation rates . . . .”).
270.
In the criminal context, the absence of a recording could potentially give
“rise to a presumption that the defendant’s version of events should be accepted,
absent (1) a compelling reason explaining the failure to record, and (2) a finding
that the defendant’s version of events could not be believed by a reasonable person.”
David A. Harris, Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance, supra note 231, at 365;
Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 897, 944 (2017) [hereinafter Fan, Justice Visualized] (“In
jurisdictions that require video recording, where video is missing or part of an event
is unrecorded, judges should inquire into the reasons for the gaps and omissions.”).
271.
See Fan, Democratizing Policing, supra note 242, at 1661 (arguing that
despite “legitimate reasons for not recording, such as the exigencies and stress of
the moment, technological malfunction, inexperience, the transition to new
technology and mandates, and other mistakes,” there are “potentially problematic
reasons for failure to record, such as refusal to comply with rules, concealment, or
subversion”).
272.
This is contrary to suggestions from scholars in the criminal context
that “[c]ourts should accept reasonable explanations without penalty lest other
departments considering adopting body cameras be deterred from voluntarily
undertaking reform.” Fan, Justice Visualized, supra note 270, at 956. In this
context, there is only one department at the federal level who would be
implementing BWCs, and, once implemented, the absence of footage should be
taken seriously and should operate to benefit the asylum seeker.
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fear of return on video. 273 This is why the presumption in favor of an
asylum seeker in the absence of a recording is so important.

5. The Necessary Reliance on Immigration Officials
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, Even With
Video Evidence
One major concern with the implementation of BWCs at the
border is whether—even if ICE trial attorneys and CBP agents and
supervisors have video evidence of the screening interview with an
asylum seeker—they will exercise discretion favorably. In Cecilia’s
case, if a video existed of her first interaction with a border official
where she explained that she was fleeing for her life, would CBP have
later rescinded that removal order? Or, would the ICE trial attorney
have actually exercised his discretion in a positive way to preserve her
asylum claim? These questions cannot be answered, but of course clear
video evidence makes it more likely that an agency employee would
admit the mistake and remedy the situation, correcting the injustice.
Ultimately, though, under current law there is no effective
mechanism for correcting an unjustifiably issued expedited removal
order, even if the errors are obvious and documented. This would
require a change in the law and in the jurisdiction awarded to
immigration judges, who currently have no authority to grant asylum
where a removal order has been reinstated. This change in the law may
be more likely to occur, however, if a repository of neutral evidence
existed, such as recordings of individual screenings at the border. Such
data could be combed to make the case for more comprehensive
statutory or regulatory reform, which may include empowering
immigration judges with the jurisdiction to determine whether a
particular prior removal order should bar an individual from asylum
protection.

6. Reliability of Video Evidence
Finally, video evidence is not perfect, and although there is the
temptation to assume that a video presents a neutral account of what
has transpired, the perspective and angle of the camera will actually
lead to varying interpretations of what has occurred, as does the bias

273.
HRF, CROSSING THE LINE, supra note 6, at 12 (detailing CBP officer
manipulation of the interview and the video recording).
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with which an audience views a video. 274 This is clearly a concern in
the criminal context as juries and judges try to understand what
exactly transpired and who is at fault. In credible fear screenings,
however, video evidence may be more straightforward. Given the way
the statute and regulations are written, the screening interview is
intended to function, as David Martin describes it, as a “beep test.” 275
This means that if an immigrant indicates she has a fear of return or
is seeking asylum, this triggers an automatic referral from CBP to
USCIS for a fear interview. The video should reliably reveal whether
or not such a fear was expressed and thus whether or not the CBP
officer took the appropriate, lawfully-mandated action.
Particular populations are especially at risk in the expedited
removal process. Indigenous or rare language speakers, for example,
are disadvantaged. Those who do not speak common languages like
Spanish are often unable to communicate with border officials. 276 In
this instance, even a video of the interaction could be inadequate.
However, recording the interaction that did occur, even when
interpretation was wrong or missing, would surely be better than
failing to have any record of the interaction at all.

7. Logistical and Financial Costs of Body-Worn Cameras at
the Border
Implementing BWCs for CBP will come with costs and
challenges. Because CBP operates across state borders and even within
Indian reservations, it may have to contend with various state laws
regarding privacy and consent to video recording. 277 Further, the data
for secondary screening interviews will need to be stored for long
periods of time. It may take months or even years for a wrongfully
deported asylum seeker to re-enter the United States and pursue her
claim for protection. Even if she is admitted the first time and needs
274.
Fan, Justice Visualized, supra note 270, at 947–53; see also Fan,
Democratizing Policing, supra note 242, at 1658–64 (“Video is no magic bullet to
end fierce conflicts in interpretation . . . .”); Stoughton, supra note 224, at 1405–13
(discussing the limits of human interpretation and cognitive bias).
275.
See Martin, Expedited Removal, supra note 108, at 68.
276.
This problem remains, even in immigration court. See Jennifer Medina,
Anyone Speak K’iche’ or Mam? Immigration Courts Overwhelmed by Indigenous
Languages, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/
19/us/translators-border-wall-immigration.html
[https://perma.cc/UB9B-HGXT]
(explaining a shortage of interpreters, particularly for indigenous languages spoken
in Guatemala, in the immigration court system).
277.
BODY CAMERAS AND CBP, supra note 223, at 14–16.
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evidence involving her interaction with CBP, she will typically wait for
several years for her case to be adjudicated in immigration court. As
such, a FOIA request for the A-file containing the video recording may
be submitted years after the original interaction with CBP.
The cost of implementing BWCs throughout CBP may be
substantial. This may be mitigated, however, by the fact that CBP has
also launched virtual processing en masse in certain locations, like
McAllen, Texas. Where fear screenings are already being conducted by
officers stationed in remote locations using video technology, it does
not seem that simply recording those screening interview would add
much or even any financial burden. 278 Further, CBP has not struggled
in recent years with Congressional appropriations, currently having a
budget of over sixteen billion dollars per year. 279 Further, it may be
more politically feasible for Congress to vote to ensure that border
officials follow existing law, rather than voting to change the law itself
to improve the treatment of asylum seekers and migrants.
Ultimately, the implementation of BWCs is the most practical
and politically feasible solution as a step to remedy the injustice
perpetrated by the interplay of the expedited removal and
reinstatement of removal processes. 280 It is, however, an imperfect
solution that still relies on the exercise of discretion by a government
official. Even with incontestable evidence that an asylum seeker
articulated her fear in the first instance during a screening interview
with a border agent, nothing in the law mandates that a trial attorney
or border supervisory agent exercise their discretion to rescind the
erroneously issued removal order.
Further, there will undoubtedly be instances where the asylum
seeker, although genuinely afraid and with a legitimate claim, does fail
278.
2016 USCIRF REPORT, supra note 75, at 24 (detailing how CBP
virtually processed 100,000 individuals in McAllen, Texas using video technology
in less than 2 years).
279.
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FISCAL YEAR 2018, at
11
(2018),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20FY18%20BIB%20Fin
al.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VWU-TMZ8] (reporting that CBP’s budget is around $16
billion, with an almost $3 billion increase between 2017 and 2018).
280.
Instituting BWCs for CBP officers is a forward-looking solution—
meaning that it will not benefit those asylum seekers who have already been
unlawfully turned back by CBP officers and did not receive their credible fear
interview the first time they articulated a fear. Indeed, there are thousands of
erroneously issued expedited removal orders working their way through the courts.
For these cases, advocates should continue to build the record and document the
widespread abuse of the expedited removal system.
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to articulate her fear in the first instance, and the existence of video
footage capturing this may serve to further undermine her credibility
and claim for even withholding protection. Even then, however, one
advantage of the existence of video footage is that it could be used to
show patterns of abuse and to highlight bad actors.
Finally, it is entirely possible that an individual who otherwise
would have disclosed her fear during the screening process will be
deterred from doing so because of the presence of a video camera or the
knowledge that what she says is being recorded. In sum, however,
given the current chaotic state of affairs at the border and the daily
injustices within the expedited removal system, the careful and
complete implementation of BWCs will likely save more lives than it
will harm. Until more systemic reform is feasible, BWCs should be
introduced and implemented at the border.

CONCLUSION
Oversight and reform is needed now more than ever. Asylum
seekers will not stop coming to our borders, even if we turn them away.
Cecilia did not stop fighting to save her life when she was erroneously
denied access to the asylum process in 2014 and sought help again the
very next month, and again a year later.
Asylum seekers like Cecilia are not going to stop seeking
protection in the United States, because they have nowhere else to
go. 281 We must meet international and domestic obligations to protect
them. This Article exposes the highly problematic interplay of
expedited removal and reinstatement of removal. These two systems
interact to create an almost always permanent barrier to meaningful
protection for asylum seekers.

281.
See Drake & Gibson, Vanishing Protection, supra note 6, at 119
(“Essentially, people are trapped in a burning house, and the United States is
hoping that locking the front door will discourage them from trying to escape the
flames. Until the root humanitarian crises are addressed, forced migration will
continue.”). Indeed, despite the Trump Administration’s targeted focus on vilifying
and attempting to prevent asylum seekers from seeking protection in the United
States, high numbers of women and children fleeing violence in Central America
continue to arrive at the U.S. southern border. See Cristobal Ramón, New Border
Apprehensions Data Shows More Families and Children Arriving at the U.S.
Border, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR. (Mar. 18, 2019), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/
blog/new-border-apprehensions-data-shows-more-families-and-children-arrivingat-the-u-s-border/ [https://perma.cc/Y29N-VBK2].
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For a mother like Cecilia who is permanently separated from
her young son, withholding protection is not meaningful protection at
all. While Cecilia can live and work in the United States and raise her
daughter, she is not who Congress intended to be barred from asylum
protection. The other bars to asylum protection, which render an
individual eligible only for withholding, contemplate an individual’s
delay in filing for asylum or the fact that she may have already received
protection in another country. Further, an immigration judge has no
power to consider whether or not these factors should operate to bar an
asylum seeker from the most meaningful form of protection. For
Cecilia, the only difference between her and an individual granted
asylum and able to fully integrate and pursue family reunification is
that the officers she encountered at the border in 2014 failed to follow
the law. They failed to properly screen her for asylum eligibility and
issued two erroneous expedited removal orders that have forever
changed the course of her life.
We can and must do better. Of the solutions proposed in this
Article, the implementation of body-worn cameras for CBP officers
interacting with individuals crossing the border is the most practical
and politically feasible strategy while additional structural solutions
are developed and litigation-based strategies play out. We must seize
the opportunity to take advantage of technology, which was not
contemplated in 1996 when the expedited removal system was created,
but can be harnessed today to remedy some of the shortcomings of the
system and increase protection for asylum seekers.

***

